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For the Criminal Practitioner
A review of all 1995 criminal cases
decided by the Fourth Circuit
Thomas R. Ascik*
Introductory Notes
1. This is the fifth annual review of all of the published criminal
opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The
review covers calendar year 1995.
2. All cases have been analyzed for points of law. Each point of law
is set out separately. Almost every case is cited for more than one point of
law.
3. As in the past, there are three full sections devoted exclusively to
specific federal statutory crimes. These are Parts IV, V, and VI, dealing
with drug, firearm, and all other federal crimes, respectively. The longest
section, Part VIII, concerns sentencing and the many constructions of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. Appeal of Sentences is the last subpart
in that section.
4. The following subsections may be of special interest:
Cases Remanded for Resentencing and Appeals Dismissed,
Parts VIII.A. and B., pages 539-41.
Appeal and Other Post-Conviction Proceedings, especially the
subparts on standards of review, Part IX, pages 562-79.
Convictions Overturned and Other Cases Reversed and Re-
manded, subparts IX.A. and B., pages 562-64.
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L ARREST, SEARCHAND SEIZURE
A. Search Warrants
1. Magistrate Judge's Finding of Probable Cause Entitled to "Great
Deference." "[Ain appellate court must accord great deference to a magis-
trate's finding of probable cause. . . . [Tihe magistrate's determination
should be overturned ... only if there is no 'substantial basis' for conclud-
ing that probable cause existed." Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1380
(4th Cir. 1995).
2. Challenging Facial Validity of Search Warrant: Right to Franks
Hearing. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Supreme Court
stated the narrow basis upon which a facially valid search warrant may be
challenged: (1) if the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing of
a recklessly false statement in the affidavit and (2) if the defendant also
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shows that the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable
cause. In Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit
upheld the district court's denial of a Franks hearing and restated its policy
of construing Franks "very strictly .... in large part ... Franks hearings
are not required unless an omission from a warrant affidavit is the product
of a deliberate falsehood or done in reckless disregard of the truth." Sim-
mons, 47 F.3d at 1383.
3. Private Citizens May Aid Officers to Conduct Search (18 U.S. C.
§ 3105). Section 3105 of Title 18 authorizes the use of private citizens to act
"in aid of" law enforcement officers conducting searches pursuant to search
warrants. There must not be an independent purpose for the private citizens
to be accompanying the officers. Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347 (4th
Cir. 1995) (denying defendant-officers' qualified immunity claim against
allegation that private citizens with police were acting independently of
police and were looking for items not named in search warrant).
B. Exceptions to Warrant Requirement
1. "Exit Search" Is Border Search. "[W]e join the several other circuit
courts which have held that the Ramsey border search exception extends to
all routine searches at the nation's borders, irrespective of whether persons
or effects are entering or exiting from the country." United States v. Oriak-
hi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1297 (4th Cir.) (citing United States v. Ramsay, 431 U.S.
606 (1977)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 400 (1995).
2. More Than "Routine" Border Search Requires Reasonable Suspicion.
"[A] border search that goes beyond the routine is nevertheless justified by
reasonable suspicion, a lesser standard than required for analogous non-
border searches." United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1297 (4th Cir.)
(justifying exit search on basis of sovereign's need to protect itself from
illegal currency export, especially as part of narcotics trade), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 400 (1995).
3. Consent to Search a Question of Fact. Determining whether consent
to search was voluntary and free from express or implied duress or coercion
requires resolution of questions of fact. United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d
248, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973)); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 875 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2287 (1995).
4. Police Need Not Inform Suspect of Right to Refuse Consent.
"Schneckloth does not require that the subject of a search have knowledge
of his right to refuse consent." United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 875
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(4th Cir.) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2287 (1995).
5. Search Incident to Arrest of Driver of Vehicle. Upon the arrest and
removal of a driver from his vehicle, law officers are "free to conduct a
search of the interior compartment of the vehicle, including the glove com-
partment." United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir.) (upholding
warrantless search that found firearm in glove compartment), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 222 (1995).
6. Terry (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1960)) Stops
a. Definition. A Terry stop is a limited detention less intrusive than
an arrest. "A brief but complete restriction of liberty is valid under Terry."
United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted) (determining that detention of those found near rural marijuana
patch was justified). A Terry stop is evaluated objectively according to the
facts of the stop, not by the subjective views of either the officers or the
suspect. Id.; United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 1995)
(finding that illegal license tags justified stop regardless of whether officer
also had reasonable suspicion from another source).
b. Based on "Reasonable Suspicion." "[R]easonable suspicion can
arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show proba-
ble cause." United States v. Penin, 45 F.3d 869, 872 (4th Cir.) (quoting
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2287
(1995).
c. Reasonable Suspicion May Be Based on Tip with Some Corrobo-
ration. "We have held that [a]n informant's tip can provide the justification
for a Teny stop even if the informant's reliability is unknown, and certainly
can do so if ... the information is corroborated." United States v. Perrin,
45 F.3d 869, 872 (4th Cir.) (finding officer had reasonable suspicion in light
of two similar call-in tips, officer's personal knowledge of defendant, and
reasonable inference that person suspected of dealing drugs might be armed),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2287 (1995).
d. Scope. A Teny stop or detention must be "reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place." United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109 (4th Cir. 1995) (quot-
ing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). Officers may take actions, such
as searches, that are "necessary to protect their safety, maintain the status
quo, and confirm or dispel their suspicions." Id. at 1109 (quoting United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985)). They may question an
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individual or attempt "to obtain his consent to a search when reasonable
suspicion exists." 1d. at 1110.
e. Length of Detention. "Terry stops differ from custodial interro-
gation in that they must last no longer than necessary to verify or dispel the
officer's suspicion." United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109 (4th Cir.
1995).
f Permissible Actions by Officers at Terry Stop. The following
actions do not necessarily elevate a Terry stop into an arrest or custodial
detention: asking questions, asking for permission to conduct a search,
drawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect, placing a suspect into a patrol car
for questioning, or threatening or actually using force. United States v.
Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (listing actions which do not
necessarily elevate Terry stop to arrest).
C. Exclusionary Rule
1. Limitations. The Supreme Court has ruled that the exclusionary rule
should be restricted to "those areas where its remedial objectives are most
efficaciously served." United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 930 (4th Cir.
1995) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974))
(concluding that exclusionary rule is not remedy for alleged violation of
Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385).
2. Exclusion Not Required When Independent Basis Exists. "The
Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not require
the suppression of evidence initially discovered during the government's
illegal entry of private premises, if that evidence is also uncovered during a
later legal search that is wholly independent of the improper one." United
States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988)) (determining that regardless of
legality of warrantless search of residence, same evidence subsequently
discovered during unquestionably legal car stop was admissible). United
States v. Walton, 56 F.3d 551, 554 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding subsequent
search warrant to be independent of initial illegal entry).
3. Manner ofAsserting Rights May Lead to Leon Good-Faith Exception
to Exclusionary Rule. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the
Supreme Court established the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
whereby an officer's objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant may
validate a search even if the search warrant is later ruled to be defective. In
United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit
ruled that a search warrant based on a suspect's refusal to allow officers to
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search his residence was improper and that the officers should have known
that the mere assertion of constitutional rights cannot establish probable
cause. However, the court of appeals allowed a good-faith exception be-
cause it found that the officers could have reasonably relied on the circum-
stances and nervous and aggressive manner in which the defendant asserted
his rights. "Because the officers reasonably could have relied on the magis-
trate's determination that the manner in which Hyppolite asserted his rights
could support a finding of probable cause, we affirm the district court's
denial of Hyppolite's motion to suppress." Id. at 1157.
D. Standards for Review of Suppression Hearings
Factual findings by the district court at a suppression hearing are
reviewed by an appeals court for clear error, but legal determinations are
reviewed de novo. United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir.
1995); United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 1995). "[I]t
is the role of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibil-
ity during a pre-trial motion to suppress.... We review credibility determi-
nations and resulting factual findings for clear error, according deference to
the district court." United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161, 1169 (4th Cir.
1995) (citing United States v. Locklear, 829 F.2d 1314, 1317 (4th Cir.
1987)).
E. Standing to Assert Fourth Amendment Rights
1. Motions to Suppress Must Be Raised Pretrial (Fed. R. Crim. P.
12(b)(3)). Rule 12(b)(3) requires that motions to suppress be raised pretrial
or they are waived under Rule 12(f). "Like all waiver rules, this one may
sometimes operate to a defendant's significant disadvantage - even provable
prejudice - but there are significant reasons for applying the rule with
vigor." United States v. Ricco, 52 F.3d 58, 62 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 254 (1995). The rule places on the defendant a duty to inform his
counsel of any evidence that might support a motion to suppress. Id. (find-
ing irrelevant claim that defense counsel did not learn of evidence in time for
filing motion).
2. Person Who Abandons Property Has No Standing. A person who
voluntarily abandons property may not later assert a Fourth Amendment
right concerning the property. Thus, he may not move to suppress evidence
taken from the property. United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir.
1995) (finding bags and backpack were abandoned because defendants
disclaimed ownership); United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248 (4th Cir.
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1995) (refusing to suppress evidence from abandoned car and apartment
from which evicted).
3. No Standing to Contest Search of Third Party. "It is well-established
that a criminal defendant does not have standing to contest the search of a
third party unless he can show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the area searched or the property seized." United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d
923, 930 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (discussing search of car of third
party); see United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).
4. No "Co-Conspirator Exception" to Standing Rule. A co-conspirator
cannot assert a right of privacy in the property of another co-conspirator.
United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 931 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing United
States v. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. 1936, 1939 (1993)) (discussing admissibility of
evidence seized in search of co-conspirator's car).
F. Wiretapping (18 U.S. C. § 2510, et seq.)
1. Justification for Wiretap "Not Great" but Must Be Specific
(§ 2518(3) (c)). A wiretap is authorized only if normal investigative tech-
niques have failed or are likely to fail. The burden on the government to
demonstrate this justification is "not great," but it must be specific and based
on the facts of the investigation. United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290
(4th Cir.) (finding wiretap appropriate because government showed, inter
alia, that it had exhausted investigative techniques using surveillance,
telephone tolls, informants, and undercover operatives), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 400 (1995).
2. Wiretap Invasion of Privacy Must Be Minimized (§ 2518(5)). "The
minimization requirement [of the wiretap statute] is satisfied if on the whole
the agents have shown a high regard for the right of privacy and have done
all they reasonably could to avoid unnecessary intrusion." United States v.
Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1300 (4th Cir.) (concluding that telephone call
between defendant and his sister-in-law that included discussion of money
was relevant to investigation of defendant for exporting drug proceeds), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 400 (1995).
G. Digital Display Pager-Is Not Pen Register (18 U.S. C. §§ 3121-3127)
Sections 3121-3127 of Title 18 permit the government to seek a court
order allowing the attachment of pen registers that record outgoing telephone
numbers and trap-and-trace devices that record incoming telephone numbers
to suspects' telephone lines. The Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. Mary-
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land, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), that because these two apparatuses record only
phone numbers without any substantive conversation, they do not violate the
Fourth Amendment. In Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 1995), the
Fourth Circuit ruled that because they are capable of receiving substantive
messages in code, digital display pagers are not pen registers or trap-and-
trace devices. Therefore, use of digital display pagers according to a mere
"certification" standard, which is less than probable cause, is not sanctioned
by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.
H. Standard for Warrantless Arrest
"A warrantless arrest . . . requires that the arresting officers possess
probable cause to believe that the person has committed or is committing a
felony offense. If probable cause was lacking, . . . the evidence seized as
a result of [the] arrest should have been suppressed. To determine whether
probable cause existed, courts look to the totality of the circumstances
known to the officers at the time of the arrest." United States v. Al-Talib,
55 F.3d 923, 931 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (upholding warrantless
arrest).
II. CONFESSIONS AND OTHER STATEMENTS
A. When Suspect Is "in Custody "for Miranda Purposes
1. Definition of "Custody." Miranda warnings are required when a
suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation. "A suspect is 'in custody' for
Miranda purposes if the suspect has been formally arrested or if he is
questioned under circumstances in which his Freedom of action is curtailed
to the degree associated with a formal arrest." United States v. Leshuk,
65 F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (finding that defen-
dant was not in custody, but only subjected to Terry stop).
2. Terry and Vehicular Stops Are Not Custody. "In Berkemer [v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)], the Supreme Court held that Miranda
warnings are not required when a person is questioned during a routine
traffic stop or stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)." United
States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Berkemer,
468 U.S. at 437-42).
B. Edwards Rule and Subsequent Confessions
1. Interrogation Must Cease When Right to Counsel Invoked. In
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Supreme Court ruled that a
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custodial interrogation must cease when an accused invokes his right to
counsel. There can be no further interrogation without counsel unless the
accused himself initiates further conversation. But even if the police wrong-
fully proceed with interrogation, subsequent statements of the accused may
not be tainted if a break in custody occurs. Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d
1279 (4th Cir.) (finding Edwards violation harmless), cert. and stay of
execution denied sub nom. Correll v. Jabe, 116 S. Ct. 688 (1995).
2. Miranda Broader Than Fifth Amendment. "Elstad thus makes clear
that when the initial confession is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment, a later voluntary confession may be tainted by the earlier one, but
when the earlier confession merely violated the technical proscriptions of
Miranda, no taint analysis is necessary." Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d
1279, 1290 (4th Cir.), cert. and stay of execution denied sub nom. Correll
v. Jabe, 116 S. Ct. 688 (1995). Thus, a confession obtained in violation of
Miranda and Edwards may still be voluntary. The rules established by those
two cases may be violated without a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
at 1289-90 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)) (finding that
despite prior Edwards violation, later confession was valid).
C. Sound of Voice
1. Sound of Voice Is Not Testimonial. "[Tihe sound of a defendant's
voice, even if heard during privileged communications, is not itself testimo-
nial, and therefore is not protected by the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination." Furthermore, it is not a violation of the right to
counsel for an agent to hear the sound of a defendant's voice outside of the
presence of counsel. United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1299
(4th Cir.) (discussing use of agent's testimony that he heard defendant's
voice while escorting him as prisoner to lay foundation for trial testimony
that agent knew defendant's voice), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 400 (1995).
2. Sound of Voice Is Not Plea Negotiation (Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e) (6)).
"This rule, which is intended to promote active and open plea negotiations,
limits the admissibility of statements, but does not protect the sound of an
accused's voice, no more than it protects against any other descriptive aspect
of the accused." United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir.)
(discussing agent's testimony that he heard defendant's voice at plea negotia-
tions), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 400 (1995).
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D. Conversants Assume Risk in Conversations
The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee the privacy of all conversa-
tions. If a criminal is conversing unwittingly with a police informant and if
his conversation is being broadcast over radio, for example, then the crimi-
nal is assuming the risks that the conversation will not be kept private. In
re Askin, 47 F.3d 100 (4th Cir.) (discussing congressional protection of
privacy of radio portion of portable telephone conversations), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 382 (1995).
III. MISCELLANEOUS PRETRIAL ISSUES
A. Grand Jury
1. Quashing Indictment Because of Government Misconduct. A district
court has the power to quash an indictment because of government miscon-
duct but only when the misconduct "'substantially influenced the grand
jury's decision to indict' or if there is 'grave doubt' that the decision to
indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations." United
States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bank of
Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1988)).
2. Government's Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Is Not
Misconduct. "The Court's ruling in United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36
(1992), made clear that a failure by the government to disclose even substan-
tial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury does not constitute... miscon-
duct." United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 1995).
3. Standard of Review for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Clear Error.
"Because the issue of prosecutorial misconduct is primarily a fact-based
inquiry, we now hold that a district court's findings on that issue are re-
viewed for clear error." United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248, 253
(4th Cir. .1995) (applying de novo review in this case because district court
made no factual findings).
B. Venue (18 U.S.C. § 3237, Fed. R. Crim. P. 18)
1. Venue May Be in Multiple Districts. "For continuing offenses,
Congress has provided that venue may be established in any district 'in
which such offense was begun, continued, or completed."' United States v.
Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3237).
2. Proof of Venue. Venue is proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1995).
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3. Venue in Conspiracies. Since an act of a single co-conspirator can
be attributed to all co-conspirators, venue can be established in any district
where any co-conspirator commits a conspiratorial act. United States v. Al-
Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1995).
4. "No Such Thing" as "Venue Entrapment." "There is no such thing
as 'manufactured venue' or 'venue entrapment.' ... Entrapment rules have
no applicability to venue." United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 929
(4th Cir. 1995).
C. Notice
1. Definition. "It is axiomatic that [d]ue process requires that a crimi-
nal statute provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that
his contemplated conduct is illegal, for no man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be
proscribed." United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1995)
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976)).
2. Standard for Void-for-Vagueness Challenges. "[Viagueness chal-
lenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be
examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand." United States v.
Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 942 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)). "The general rule [is] that '[o]ne to whose
conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vague-
ness."' Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974)).
D. Joinder and Severance (Fed. R. Crim. P. 8, 14)
1. Severance of Defendants at Discretion of Trial Court. The trial
court has discretion whether to grant or deny a severance of defendants. The
moving party may not simply establish that he would have a better chance
of acquittal; he must establish actual prejudice from a joint trial. United
States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763, 767 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2597
(1995); United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1266 (4th Cir.) (holding that
moving party must show that nonseverance "would compromise a specific
trial right"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995).
2. Standard When Need Asserted for Co-Defendant's Testimony. When
a defendant seeks a severance of defendants because of an asserted need for
a co-defendant's testimony, he must show: "(1) a bona fide need for the
testimony of his co-defendant; (2) the likelihood that the co-defendant would
testify at a second trial and waive his Fifth Amendment privilege; (3) the
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substance of his co-defendant's testimony; and (4) the exculpatory nature and
effect of such testimony." United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763, 767
(4th Cir.) (upholding denial of severance because co-defendant put condi-
tions on his willingness to testify), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2597 (1995).
3. Joinder of Separate Offenses Is Permissible. "In cases where the
offenses are identical or strikingly similar in the method of operation and
occur over a short period of time, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny
severance [of counts]." United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514 (4th Cir.
1995) (denying severance of counts for four bank robberies over nine
months).
E. Double Jeopardy
1. Double Jeopardy and Successive Conspiracies. See Drug Conspira-
cies: Double Jeopardy and Successive Conspiracies, infra, Part IV.F. 10.
2. Double Jeopardy Bars Multiple Trials as Well as Multiple Punish-
ments. "[Tihe right conferred by the Double Jeopardy Clause cannot fully
be vindicated by post-conviction relief because it is a prohibition not only of
multiple punishments, but also of multiple trials." Gilliam v. Foster, 61
F.3d 1070, 1081 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (8-5 decision) (enjoining state
criminal trial).
3. Even Erroneous Acquittal Is Bar to Reprosecution. "[A] verdict of
acquittal is final and a bar to all subsequent prosecution for the same offense,
even where the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous founda-
tion." United States v. Ham, 58 F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir.) (citing Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 513
(1995).
4. No Double Jeopardy Bar If Defendant Consents to Mistrial. "If a
judge declares a mistrial over the defendant's objection or without the
defendant's consent, the defendant cannot be retried unless there was 'mani-
fest necessity' for the termination of the first trial. . . .However, if the
defendant moved for mistrial or otherwise consents to the mistrial, the
defendant can be reprosecuted unless he can demonstrate that the prosecutor
or judge provoked the mistrial." United States v. Ham, 58 F.3d 78, 82-83
(4th Cir.) (noting that because defendant did not object when court errone-
ously dismissed jury before special forfeiture verdict rendered, he could be
retried on forfeiture charge), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 513 (1995); see also
United States v. Johnson, 55 F.3d 976 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no double
jeopardy problem because defendant, albeit at trial court's invitation, moved
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for mistrial at first trial); Gilliam v. Foster, 61 F.3d 1070 (4th Cir. 1995) (8-
5 decision) (en banc) (enjoining state criminal trial because prior trial judge
erroneously granted mistrial over defendant's objection).
5. Retrial May Be Barred Even If Defendant Caused Original Mistrial.
As long as there was no bad faith, a mistake by defense counsel that caused
the trial judge to grant a mistrial over the defense's objection may bar retrial.
Gilliam v. Foster, 63 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 1995) (habeas corpus ruling) (8-5
decision) (en banc).
6. Retrial Barred Only When Issue Definitively Resolved. In United
States v. Ham, 58 F.3d 78 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 513 (1995),
the defendant was convicted of racketeering at his first trial, but the jury
found that only some of the alleged predicate acts had been proven. When
the first conviction was overturned on appeal, the defendant argued that
double jeopardy barred retrial of the omitted predicate acts. The Fourth
Circuit ruled that "[a] jury's failure to decide an issue will be treated as an
implied acquittal only where the jury's verdict necessarily resolves an issue
in the defendant's favor." 1d. at 85. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
original jury's decision not to check some of the predicate acts could mean
that the jury found either that he did not commit those acts or that the jury
could not reach agreement on those acts. Therefore, the issue was not
definitively or "necessarily" resolved. Id.
F. Vindictive Prosecution and Legitimate Plea Negotiations
1. Prosecutorial Vindictiveness. Prosecutorial vindictiveness almost
always concerns post-trial or post-some-other-judicial-proceedings actions
by the prosecutor designed to retaliate against a defendant for vindicating a
legal right. United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Prosecutor Has Great Latitude in Plea Negotiations. "[I]n the 'give-
and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or
retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prose-cution's
offer." United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 658, 661 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).
3. Prosecutor May Threaten Defendant With Greater Charges.
"Bordenkircher and Goodwin have made it clear that a prosecutor, in the
context of plea negotiations, can threaten to bring a more severe indictment
against a defendant to pressure him into pleading guilty." United States v.
Williams, 47 F.3d 658, 662 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Good-
win, 457 U.S. 368 (1982), and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
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(1978)); see also United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995)
(noting that greater penalty was allowed for same charges), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 749 (1996).
4. Prosecutor May Threaten Greater Charges Against Defendant Who
Refuses to Cooperate. "It follows from Bordenkircher and Goodwin that a
prosecutor, in the context of plea negotiations, may threaten a defendant with
a more severe prosecution and carry out those threats if the defendant refuses
to cooperate with the police in the criminal investigation of another person.
A defendant's cooperation with the police is a legitimate concession for a
prosecutor to seek during plea negotiations. t" United States v. Williams, 47
F.3d 658, 662 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S.
368 (1982), and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)) (reversing
district court and agreeing with Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits).
5. Prosecutor Not Bound by Initial Charges. "The Supreme Court has
already made clear, however, that a prosecutor is not bound by his initial
assessment of the case embodied in the original charges. Before trial, the
prosecutor's assessment of the proper extent of prosecution may not have
crystallized, and the prosecutor should have the freedom to reassess the case
and bring new charges if they are warranted." United States v. Williams, 47
F.3d 658, 664 (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381 (1982)).
G. Mental-Competency Hearing (18 U.S. C. § 4241)
1. Test for Mental Competence. "The conviction of a defendant when
he is legally incompetent is a violation of due process. . . . The test for
mental competence is whether the defendant 'has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the pro-
ceedings against him."' United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th
Cir. 1995) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).
2. When Hearing Required. According to 18 U.S.C. § 4241, the issue
of the defendant's mental competency to assist his lawyer in his defense and
to understand the proceedings against him may be raised by either party or
by the court at any time prior to sentencing. If "reasonable cause" exists
that a defendant is mentally incompetent, the district court is obliged to
conduct a competency hearing. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th
Cir. 1995) (remanding for competency hearing or new trial because district
court used stricter legal standard than "reasonable cause" and because
"reasonable cause" did exist).
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3. Retrospective Competency Hearing Is Possible. Although obviously
difficult, a hearing to determine if a defendant was competent at some prior
stage of the proceedings is possible. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286
(4th Cir. 1995) (indicating that district court must grant new trial if it finds
that retrospective hearing is impossible).
H. Guilty Pleas (Fed. R. Crim. P. 11)
1. Failure to Inform Defendant of Mandatory Minimum Sentence at
Rule 11 Hearing Invalidates Plea. In United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400
(4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit overturned a guilty plea because the
district court did not inform the defendant of a mandatory minimum sentence
at the Rule 11 hearing and because there was no indication in the record that
the defendant (or his counsel) otherwise knew of the mandatory sentence.
Although the mandatory sentence was included in the presentence report, the
Fourth Circuit held that the presentence report issued subsequent to the Rule
11 hearing could not cure the Rule 11 failure.
2. Court Need Not Inform Defendant of Guideline Range. "In United
States v. Good, 25 F.3d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 1994), we held that Rule 11(c)(1)
does not require a district court to advise the defendant about the applicable
guideline range before accepting a guilty plea." United States v. Puckett, 61
F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995).
3. Six-Factor Test for Withdrawal of Guilty Plea. In United States v.
Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991),
the Fourth Circuit laid out the six factors that it will consider in assessing
whether a defendant had a "fair and just" reason in support of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea: "(1) whether the defendant has offered credible
evidence that his plea was not knowing or not voluntary; (2) whether the
defendant has credibly asserted his legal innocence; (3) whether there has
been a delay between the entering of the plea and the filing of the motion;
(4) whether the defendant has had close assistance of competent counsel;
(5) whether withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government; (6) and
whether it will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources."
United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145 (4th Cir. 1995).
4. Three Factors Most Important. "The factors that speak most
straightforwardly to the question whether the movant has a fair and just
reason to upset settled systemic expectations by withdrawing her plea are the
first, second, and fourth. In contrast, the third, fifth, and sixth factors are
better understood as countervailing considerations that establish how heavily
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the presumption should weigh in any given case.t" United States v. Sparks,
67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1995).
5. Extremely Difficult to Withdraw Guilty Plea (Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(e)). An "appropriately conducted Rule 11 proceeding . . . raise[s] a
strong presumption that the plea is final and binding." United States v.
Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (denying withdrawal of plea) (quoting United
States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en bane), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 672 (1994). "A district court's assessment of these
factors is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion." United States v.
Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1150 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding district court's
refusal to allow withdrawn plea based on defendant's claim of good-faith
belief that her acts were legal).
6. To Withdraw Guilty Plea, Defendant Bears Burden of Proof.
"Because it is essential to an orderly working of the criminal justice system
that guilty pleas tendered and accepted in conformity with Rule 11 can be
presumed final . . . , it is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that she
should be permitted to withdraw her plea." United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d
1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that defendant failed to carry bur-
den).
Z To Withdraw Guilty Plea Because of Alleged Legal Innocence, An
Actual Defense Must Be Shown. Under the second part of the six-part Moore
test, a defendant seeking to withdraw his guilty plea must do more than
assert his legal innocence. He must show that he has an actual legal defense.
United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that good-faith
belief in legal innocence is not enough).
8. To Withdraw Guilty Plea Because of Alleged Lack of Close Assis-
tance of Counsel, Counsel Must Be Objectively Bad. "A defendant can
demonstrate the absence of close assistance of counsel for purposes of the
Moore test only by showing that her counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d
1145, 1153 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (noting
that evidence against defendant was one factor proving that counsel's perfor-
mance was satisfactory).
L Speedy Trial (Sixth Amendment, 18 U.S. C. § 3161)
1. Four-Part Constitutional Test. "To establish a violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy and public trial, a defendant must show first
that the Amendment's protections have been triggered by 'arrest, indictment,
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or other official accusation.' The defendant must then show that on balance,
four separate factors weigh in his favor: 'whether the delay before trial was
uncommonly long, whether the government or the defendant is more to
blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right
to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result."'
United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 148 (4th Cir.) (quoting Doggett v.
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992)) (concluding that although uncom-
monly long delay of more than two years and prejudice were shown, record
showed that defendant waived his rights and had state prosecution pending
against him), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995).
2. Statutory Speedy Trial Right Triggered Only by Arrest or Indictment.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., statutory speedy trial rights are triggered
only by an arrest or an indictment. In United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995), the Fourth Circuit rejected
the defendant's claim that his speedy trial rights were triggered by a com-
plaint, an unexecuted arrest warrant, and a detainer filed against him.
3. Replacement Attorney Has No Right to Re-Start Thirty Day Period
(§ 3161(c) (2)). The trial of a defendant who has appeared with counsel may
not commence sooner than thirty days after appearance with counsel. How-
ever, if the defendant replaces his counsel, he has no right to an additional
continuance of thirty days. United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 346 (1995).
4. Plea of Not Guilty Required (§ 3161 (c) (1)). The seventy-days-until-
trial rule is triggered by § 3161(c)(1) only when a plea of not guilty has been
entered. United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding
that indictment that was dismissed by district court should be reinstated),
cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1996) (No. 95-7756).
5. Complexity of Case Is Rationale for Continuance (§ 3161(h) (8) (B)).
Under this subsection, a trial may be continued if the number of defendants
or charges, or difficult questions of law or fact make the case "unusual" or
"complex." United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2579 (1995).
J. District Court May Not Deny Government's Motion to Dismiss an
Indictment (Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a))
Absent bad faith on the part of the government, a district court may not
refuse to grant the government's motion to dismiss an indictment. Prosecu-
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torial discretion is a power of the Executive under the Constitution. United
States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1995).
K. Substitute Appointed Counsel Not Required When Defendant's Own
Behavior Creates Conflict With Counsel
"In United States v. Hanley, we enumerated three points of consider-
ation in determining whether a district court may properly deny a request for
substitute counsel: (1) whether the motion for substitute counsel was timely;
(2) whether the district court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint was
sufficient; and (3) whether the conflict between attorney and client was so
great as to amount to a 'total lack of communication,' thereby preventing an
adequate defense. 974 F.2d 14, 17 (4th Cir. 1992).... The district court
is not compelled to substitute counsel when the defendant's own behavior
creates a conflict." United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 918 (4th Cir.
1995) (concluding that defendant should be denied third appointed counsel),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996).
L. Disclosure of Confidential Informant Not Required When Informant Was
Used Only to Obtain Search Warrant
The government is not required to disclose the identity of a confidential
informant when the informant was used by the government only for the
limited purpose of obtaining a search warrant. United States v. Gray, 47
F.3d 1359 (4th Cir. 1995).
M. Motion for Return of Property (Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e))
1. Grounds. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) allows a
"person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" or by the govern-
ment's retention of property that it no longer has need of, to move the
district court for a return of property. The rule applies to anyone, whether
or not one is a criminal defendant, at any time, or whether or not criminal
proceedings are pending. United States v. Garcia, 65 F.3d 17, 19-20 (4th
Cir. 1995).
2. Federal Government Cannot Return Firearms It Does Not Possess.
In United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
237 (1995), the trial court sua sponte ordered the forfeiture of fifty-two
firearms seized in the case. The Fourth Circuit ruled that while the order
may have been premature in the absence of a motion, the order was essen-
tially meaningless because state authorities, rather than the federal govern-
ment, had seized and retained the firearms.
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N. Equitable Estoppel Cannot Be Asserted to Uphold Crime
"The doctrine of equitable estoppel is rarely invoked against the govern-
ment," and "a calculated decision to commit a felony cannot be termed
reasonable reliance." United States v. Agubata, 60 F.3d 1081, 1083-84 (4th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 929 (1996).
0. Brady/Giglio Violations
1. Standard for Brady Issues. "Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87... (1963), the defendants have the right to favorable evidence that
is of material import in the determination of guilt or punishment .... '[E]vi-
dence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome."' United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d
1239, 1242 (4th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682
(1985)) (noting probable Brady violation but concluding that violation was
not serious enough to undermine confidence in outcome), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 346 (1995); see also United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150 (4th
Cir.) (noting that allegedly withheld evidence was ultimately disclosed at
trial and concluding that outcome of case was not affected), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 266 (1995).
2. When Prosecution Possesses Brady Material. The prosecution is
responsible for turning over to the defense any Brady material that is in its
"actual or constructive possession." United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100,
1103-04 (4th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 4,
1995). But if the prosecution team, which includes its investigators, does
not know of the existence of Brady material, it cannot be deemed to have
possessed it. Id. at 1104.
3. No Disclosure Required If Evidence Available to Defense. If excul-
patory or impeaching evidence was available to the defense from other
sources or through diligent investigation, then the defense is deemed to have
had the ability to possess the evidence and the government was not required
to disclose it. Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 435 (1995).
P. Defendant Must Show Prejudice in Denial of Motion to Continue
"We review the district court's refusal to grant a continuance for abuse
of discretion. . . .Abuse of discretion has been defined in such circum-
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stances as 'an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in
the face of a justifiable request for a delay' .... However, in order to gain
a reversal of the district court's denial of a continuance, the defendant must
show prejudice .... [The defendants were required to assert specific ways
in which their defense could have been improved with the grant of a continu-
ance." United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364, 1369-70 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)).
IV. DRUG OFFENSES
A. Congress May Regulate Interstate and Intrastate Drug Activities Under
the Commerce Clause
In United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the Supreme Court
found unconstitutional the federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(q)) prohibiting
the possession of firearms in school zones. The Court found that Congress
did not have constitutional authority to enact the statute because there was
no "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. In United States v. Leshuk,
65 F.3d 1105, 1112 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit rejected a Lopez-
inspired attack on the primary federal drug trafficking statute, 21 U.S.C
§ 841. The Fourth Circuit upheld congressional findings that intrastate drug
activities have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. The court of
appeals also pointed out that because the statute itself is constitutional, the
government has no additional burden to prove the intrastate aspect in each
case. Id.
B. Quantity of Drugs
1. Proof at Trial. The quantity of drugs is a sentencing issue; the
government need only show a measurable amount of drugs at trial. United
States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir.) (noting amount of drugs required
for finding of continuing criminal enterprise), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266
(1995).
2. Proof at Sentencing. The government is required to prove the
quantity of drugs at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. The
decision of the sentencing court regarding quantity will not be overturned on
appeal unless it was clearly erroneous. United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d
923 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248 (4th Cir.
1995) (concluding that statements, direct and hearsay, of cooperating co-
conspirators together with quantity seized proved total quantity); United
States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanding case because of
miscalculation and lack of evidence of total amount of cocaine), cert. denied,
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116 S. Ct. 749 (1996). If the quantity is disputed, the sentencing court must
make an independent resolution of the factual issue at sentencing. United
States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding sentencing range),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
3. Relevant Conduct Versus Offense of Conviction. In calculating drug
quantities for sentencing, a distinction must be made between the drug
trafficking offense of conviction (e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841) and relevant
conduct (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3) of other drug trafficking. Only the amounts
attributable (reasonably foreseeable to the defendant) to the statutory offense
of conviction can be used to trigger any statutory minimum terms of impris-
onment. Relevant conduct can be used to add additional imprisonment after
it is determined whether any statutory minimums apply. United States v.
Estrada, 42 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding that application occurs
irrespective of plea agreement provisions).
4. Quantity of LSD (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), comment. (n.18); App. C,
Amend. 488). When LSD is in solid form on a solid-carrier medium (e.g.,
on a blotter paper), the quantity for sentencing is calculated by multiplying
the number of doses by .4 milligrams. When LSD is in liquid form in a
liquid-carrier medium and it is possible to determine the actual weight of the
LSD in the medium, the actual weight must be used at sentencing. When
LSD is in liquid form and it is not possible to determine the actual weight of
the LSD in the medium, then the number of doses should be determined and
that number multiplied by .05 milligrams to determine the weight for sen-
tencing. United States v. Turner, 59 F.3d 481 (4th Cir. 1995).
5. Quantity of Crack From Quantity of Cocaine. In a cocaine base
(crack) conspiracy, the court must convert the known amount of cocaine into
cocaine base to determine the final quantity of drugs. United States v.
Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit upheld in
United States v. Paz, 927 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1991), the trial court's use of
a formula to the effect that 100 grams of cocaine will yield 88 grams of
crack. United States v. Ricco, 52 F.3d 58, 63 (4th Cir.) (upholding use of
Paz formula and recognizing "the necessarily imperfect nature of the sen-
tencing court's determination" but upholding it nonetheless), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 254 (1995).
6. Quantity of Marijuana (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)). There is no constitu-
tional problem with the Sentencing Commission having created an irrebutta-
ble presumption that when an offense involves at least fifty marijuana plants
that each plant shall be treated for sentencing purposes as weighing one
kilogram. United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 323 (4th Cir. 1995) (de-
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elining to decide issue of weight of live versus harvested plants), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
7. Standard of Review On Appeal: Clear Errror. A district court's
calculation of the quantity of drugs at sentencing is reviewed on appeal for
clear error. United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1158 (4th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231, 238 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 925 (1996).
C. Aider and Abettor Subject to Mandatory Sentences (21 U.S. C. § 841).
In United States v. Pierson, 53 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth
Circuit ruled that both the federal aiding-and-abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2,
and the Sentencing Guidelines, § 2X2. 1, require that an aider and abetter of
a drug trafficking offense is subject to the same mandatory minimum sen-
tences as a principal drug trafficker. Pierson, 53 F.3d at 64-65.
D. Prosecution of Physician for Drug Dealing (21 U.S. C. § 841)
In prosecuting a physician for illegally distributing a controlled sub-
stance, the government must show that the physician acted outside of the
bounds of medical practice or not for legitimate medical purposes in the
usual course of his professional medical practice. "There are no specific
guidelines concerning what is required to support a conclusion that an
accused acted outside the usual course of professional practice. Rather, the
courts must engage in a case-by-case analysis of evidence to determine
whether a reasonable inference of guilt may be drawn from specific facts."
United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1187 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. August, 984 F.2d 705, 713 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 158 (1993)) (finding that evidence was sufficient for
conviction); see also United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132,
1141 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining requirements for convicting physician of
illegally distributing controlled substance).
E. Statutory and Sentencing Distinctions Between "Crack" and Cocaine
Upheld (21 U.S.C. § 841, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1)
The drug statute is not ambiguous about the distinction between "crack"
and cocaine, nor is it a violation of equal protection or due process to
sentence crack cases more severely. United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96,
99-100 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 329 (1995); United States v.
Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1163-64 (4th Cir.) (concluding that crack penalties
are not racially discriminatory), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995).
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F. Drug Conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 846)
1. Proof of Conspiracy. "To sustain a conspiracy conviction, the
government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew of
the existence of, and voluntarily participated in, the conspiracy .... Of
course, knowledge and participation may be proven by circumstantial evi-
dence." United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 919 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996). "The government must prove: '(1) an agree-
ment between two or more persons (who are not government agents), (2) to
commit in concert an unlawful act."' United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311,
323 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Giunta, 925 F.2d 758, 764
(4th Cir. 1991)) (explaining that proof is usually by circumstantial evidence),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
2. Cannot Conspire With Government Agent. "In United States v.
Hayes, 775 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1995), we held a defendant cannot be
convicted for conspiring with a government agent." United States v. Lewis,
53 F.3d 29, 33 (4th Cir. 1995).
3. No Overt Act Required for Drug Conspiracy. Proof of a drug con-
spiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, unlike proof of a general conspiracy under
18 U.S.C. § 371, does not require proof of an overt act. United States v.
Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 323-24 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796
(1996).
4. Only Slight Connection or One Level Required. "[O]nce a drug
conspiracy is established, all that is required is a 'slight connection between
the defendant and the conspiracy to support the conviction."' United States
v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3051 (1992)).
"Moreover, a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy if the evidence
shows a defendant's participation in only one level of the conspiracy charged
in the indictment." United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1154 (4th Cir.)
(deciding that all defendants participated in some level of conspiracy), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995); see also United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d
907, 919 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that even minor role is adequate), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996).
5. Mere Knowledge or Acquiescence Not Enough. "[Miere knowledge,
acquiescence, or approval of a crime is not enough to establish that an
individual is part of a conspiracy to distribute drugs." United States v.
Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 314 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Pupo,
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841 F.2d 1235, 1238 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 842 (1988)), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
6. Single v. Multiple Conspiracies. "A single conspiracy exists when
'[t]he conspiracy had the same objective, it had the same goal, the same
nature, the same geographic spread, the same results, and the same prod-
uct.'" United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1154 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995); see also United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d
1100, 1107 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1154), petition for
cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1995). United States v. Gray, 47
F.3d 1359, 1368-69 (4th Cir. 1995) (deciding that court must instruct on
multiple theories only if supported by facts).
7. Co-Conspirators May Also Be Competitors. The fact that drug
dealers compete for supplies and customers does not alone rule out the fact
that they are also part of the same conspiracy. United States v. Johnson, 54
F.3d 1150, 1154 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995).
8. Conspiracy May Be Loose-Knit Association. A drug conspiracy need
not have an identifiable organizational structure, nor need every co-conspira-
tor know the full scope, all the activities, or all the members of the conspir-
acy. United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1154 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 266 (1995). "Even if 'no formal structure could have been
inferred, the interdependence of participants charged.., in pursuing the
ultimate illegal object, easily could be."' United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d
1100, 1108 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044,
1054 (4th Cir. 1993)), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 4,
1995).
9. Co-Conspirators Need Not Know All Details or All Other Co-Con-
spirators. "But the government need not prove that a defendant knew every-
one in the conspiracy. Nor does the government have to prove that the
defendant participated in all phases or knew all the details of the conspir-
acy." United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1108 (4th Cir. 1995), petition
for cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1995); see also United States v.
Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 919 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 749
(1996).
10. Double Jeopardy and Successive Conspiracies. In determining
whether successive conspiracy charges have implicated double jeopardy, the
Fourth Circuit considers five factors: "(1) the time periods of the conspira-
cies; (2) the place where the conspiracies occurred; (3) the co-conspirators;
(4) the overt acts done in furtherance of the conspiracies; and (5) the sub-
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465 (1996)
stantive statutes involved." United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239, 1245-46
(4th Cir.) (finding that alleged conspiracies were separate and therefore no
double jeopardy violation occurred), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 346 (1995).
11. Admission of Co-Conspirator's Statement (Fed. R. Evid.
801(d) (2) (E)). "In order to admit evidence under 801(d)(2)(E), the moving
party must show by a preponderance of independent evidence that (1) a
conspiracy existed; (2) the declarant and the defendant were members of the
same conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made in the course of and in
furtherance of that conspiracy." United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 324
(4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that government's failure to link declarant to
conspiracy was harmless error and, alternatively, that statement could be
admitted as statement of defendant), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
12. No Redundant Convictions for Drug Conspiracy (§ 846) and Con-
tinuing Criminal Enterprise (§ 848). Under the same set of facts, a defen-
dant may not be convicted for both a drug conspiracy and a continuing
criminal enterprise. United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d. 311, 318 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996); United States v. Johnson, 54
F.3d 1150, 1162-63 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995); United
States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763, 772 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2597
(1995).
G. Continuing Criminal Enterprise (21 U.S.C. § 848)
1. Four Essential Elements. "Conviction for participating in a continu-
ing criminal enterprise (CCE) requires that the government prove four
elements: (1) the defendant committed a felony violation of the federal drug
laws; (2) the violations were part of a continuing series of violations of the
drug laws; (3) the series of violations were undertaken by the defendant in
concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom the defendant
occupied a position of organizer, supervisor or any other position of man-
agement; (4) the defendant obtained substantial income or resources from the
continuing series of violations." United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 316-
17 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
2. The Head and Five Participants. A continuing criminal enterprise
may have more than one head, and it is not necessary to show that a defen-
dant supervised or acted in concert with five other individuals at the same
time. United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1155 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 266 (1995). Every defendant need not have personal contact with
the five participants because organizational authority and responsibility may
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be delegated. United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 317 (4th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
3. Single Conspirator May Be Convicted Despite Acquittals of Co-
Conspirators. "[A]cquittals of some co-defendants on conspiracy charges
does not prevent the jury from returning a conviction against one remaining
conspirator." United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 317 (4th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
4. Life Sentence Constitutional. A life sentence, even for a first-time
drug offender, under this statute does not violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. United States v. Johnson,
54 F.3d 1150, 1164 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116"S. Ct. 266 (1995).
H. Section 851 Information Does Not Apply to Sentencing Enhancements
(21 U.S.C. § 851)
Section 851 of Title 21 requires the government to file prior to trial or
plea an information stating a defendant's prior convictions if it is seeking to
increase the defendant's sentence because of the prior convictions. United
States v. Foster, 68 F.3d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 1995). However, § 851 applies
only to increased sentences provided for by statute. Id. It does not apply to
sentencing enhancements under the Guidelines. Id.
L Forfeitures
1. Proof Is By Preponderance (21 U.S. C. § 853). A forfeiture under
§ 853 is a penalty, not an element of a substantive drug offense. Proof is,
therefore, only by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Tan-
ner, 61 F.3d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1995) (agreeing with six other circuits
by upholding preponderance jury instruction), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 925
(1996).
2. In Personam Forfeitures: When Proportionality Test Is Required (21
U.S.C. § 853). Forfeitures under § 853 are in personam and are fines.
Therefore, they are subject to proportionality review (whether fine is propor-
tional to seriousness of offense) under the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. In United States v. Wild, 47 F.3d 669, 676 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 128 (1995), the Fourth Circuit held that the value
of the property forfeited under subsections 853(a)(2) and (3) must be consid-
ered in order to determine whether the forfeiture constitutes an excessive
fine. Because the property involved under subsection 853(a)(1) is "derived
from" illegal activity, no excessiveness analysis is required. Id.
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3. In Rem Forfeitures: Instrumentality Test (18 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a) (6) &
(7)). Concerning in rem forfeitures under this subsection, an instrumentality
test focusing on the forfeited property's role in the offense is required to
determine whether the forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir.
1994). Under the instrumentality test, courts must consider "(1) the nexus
between the offense and the property and the extent of the property's role in
the offense, (2) the role and culpability of the owner, and (3) the possibility
of separating offending property that can readily be separated from the
remainder." Id.
V. FIREARMS OFFENSES
A. Dysfunctional Bomb Is Dangerous Weapon (18 U.S. C. § 111(b))
Even a dysfunctional bomb is a "dangerous weapon" under 18 U.S.C.
§ 111(b) (prohibiting assault on federal officers). United States v. Hamrick,
43 F.3d 877, 883 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 90 (1995).
"A bomb is always dangerous . . . . [Tjhe display of a bomb, like the
display of a gun, instills fear in the average citizen .... Even a dysfunc-
tional bomb engenders in the assault victims the fear of bodily injury beyond
that instilled by a simple assault . . . . [A]n inoperable bomb creates a
danger that a violent response will ensue." Id. at 881-83. The Hamrick
Court agreed with all circuits that have ruled in similar contexts and held that
a mail bomb, whether functional or not, is a dangerous weapon. Id.
B. Felon in Possession (18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (1)) and Armed Career Crimi-
nal (18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) (1))
1. Armed Career Criminal Act Is Constitutional. In United States v.
Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 67-68 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 237 (1995),
the Fourth Circuit sustained the Armed Career Criminal Act against constitu-
tional challenges based on the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Ex Post
Facto Clause, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
2. Felon in Possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)): Elements. In United
States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 615 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert denied,
116 S. Ct. 797 (1996), the Fourth Circuit agreed with the First and Second
Circuits and affirmed the standard construction of the felon-in-possession
statute, namely, that the government must show only that the convicted felon
knowingly possessed a firearm and that the firearm had an interstate nexus.
The defendant had asserted that a 1986 amendment (18 U.S.C. § 924(a)) to
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the sentencing part of the statute meant that the government must prove not
only knowing possession but also that the felon knew of his prior conviction
and knew of the interstate nexus of the firearm. Id. at 608. But, in United
States v. Tomlinson, 67 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit ruled
that "when a defendant's status as a convicted felon turns on the possession
of a particular type of firearm [e.g., machine gun, short-barreled shotgun],
a jury must be instructed that a defendant is not a convicted felon if, despite
possessing such a firearm, he did not know it had the particular nature on
which his 'convicted' status turns." Id. at 513-14. In United States v.
Milton, 52 F.3d 78 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 222 (1995), the
Fourth Circuit agreed with three other circuits and ruled that the jury must
hear of the fact of the prior felony conviction, which is an essential element
of the crime. Otherwise the jurors mistakenly might think that the defendant
was standing trial merely for possessing a firearm. Id. at 81.
3. Evidence of Possession. In United States v. Johnson, 55 F.3d 976
(4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit ruled that there was sufficient evidence
of possession when pursuing police saw the defendant stick his hand out of
his car and drop a dark object at a spot where they later found a revolver.
Id. at 979-80. But cf. United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir.
1993) (concluding that evidence of possession was insufficient when firearm
found beneath car seat of defendant and defendant only "dipped" his shoul-
der in sight of police).
4. When Civil Rights Restored. A defendant may not be convicted of
being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), if his right
to possess a firearm has been restored by state law, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
"If a felon has not received a certificate restoring civil rights, a court looks
to 'the whole of state law' of the jurisdiction in which the predicate convic-
tion occurred to determine whether a felon's civil rights have been restored
... . The restoration of civil rights need not be complete, but it must be
substantial .... The term 'civil rights' generally includes 'the right to vote,
the right to hold public office, and the right to serve on a jury' . . . . This
Court has held that the loss of the right to sit on a jury 'precludes a finding
of a substantial restoration of civil rights necessary to satisfy § 921(a)(20)."'
United States v. Morrell, 61 F.3d 279, 280-81 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted). In United States v. Thomas, 52 F.3d 82 (4th Cir. 1995), the
Fourth Circuit ruled that the government did not have to prove the specific
fact that the defendant's civil rights had not been restored when it already
had proved that the defendant had possessed the firearm within a year of the
commission of the prior felony crime. North Carolina state law restores
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civil rights only after five years from final release from custody or parole.
Id. at 85-86.
5. Involuntary Manslaughter, Escape, and Robbery Are Violent Felo-
nies. A felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) can be
sentenced as an armed career criminal (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) if he has three
prior convictions for violent or drug felonies. In United States v. Williams,
67 F.3d 527 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit rejected an argument based
on legislative history that involuntary manslaughter is not a violent felony
because it is not a specific-intent crime. Id. at 528-29. In United States v.
Hairston, 71 F.3d 115 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit cited 18 U.S.C.
§ 24(e)(2)(B)(ii) and ruled that felony escape from custody is a violent felony
because it "involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another." The Fourth Circuit emphasized that it was not looking
at the facts of the prior escape conviction but only at the conviction and the
statutory definition of the escape offense. 1d. at 117-18. In United States
v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 237 (1995), the
Fourth Circuit ruled that robbery under Virginia law is a violent felony and
again noted that what constitutes a violent felony is based only on the statu-
tory definition of the violent felony, not on the particular facts of the violent-
felony conviction. Id. at 69.
6. Prior Predicate Convictions Must Be "Separate and Distinct Crimi-
nal Episodes." Each of the three prior predicate convictions necessary to
convict a felon-in-possession as an armed career criminal must be "separate
and distinct criminal episodes," but these episodes can occur close in time.
United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir.) (concluding that
two drug sales ninety minutes apart were separate episodes), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 406 (1995).
7. Prior Predicate Convictions May Be Old. Unlike the Sentencing
Guidelines that normally do not count convictions older than fifteen years,
the three predicate violent or drug felony convictions under the Armed
Career Criminal Act may be old. "There is no temporal restriction on prior
felonies for the purposes of ACCA." United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64,
69 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 237 (1995).
C. Receiving Firearm While Under Indictment (18 U.S. C. § 922(n))
To convict under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a), the government must show that
the defendant knew that he was under indictment at the time that he received
the firearm. United States v. Forbes, 64 F.3d 928, 934 (4th Cir. 1995)
(agreeing with Fifth Circuit).
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D. Using or Carrying Firearm in Drug Trafficking or Violent Crime (18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1))
1. Supreme Court Causes Major Change in Law. In Bailey v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), the Supreme Court changed dramatically the
law of most of the federal circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, by unani-
mously concluding that "using" a firearm in a violent or drug crime requires
"active employment," rather than mere accessibility or proximity. The
decision apparently does not affect cases wherein the "carrying" of a firearm
is charged.
2. Must Be Correct Jury Instruction on Underlying Crime. If the trial
court gives an erroneous jury instruction requiring reversal of the conviction
of the underlying violent or drug crime, then the firearms conviction must
be reversed as well. United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 139, 145-46 (4th
Cir. 1995) (concluding that erroneous instruction on underlying violent
crime was not harmless).
3. Destructive Device Punished More Severely. A mandatory sentence
of thirty years plainly is required by this statute when a destructive device,
rather than an ordinary firearm, is used in drug trafficking or a violent
crime, even though the definition of a "firearm" in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)
includes the term "destructive device." United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d
877, 886 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (considering use of mail bomb), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 90 (1995).
E. Dysfunctional Bomb Is Destructive Device (26 U.S.C. §§ 5845, 5861)
Even a dysfunctional bomb is a "destructive device" (firearm) under this
statute prohibiting the making and unlawful possession and transfer of a
destructive device. "A bomb is always dangerous .... [The display of a
bomb, like the display of a gun, instills fear in the average citizen . ...
Even a dysfunctional bomb engenders in the assault victims the fear of
bodily injury beyond that instilled by a simple assault ... [A]n inoperable
bomb creates a danger that a violent response will ensue." United States v.
Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877, 881-83 (4th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
90 (1995). The Fourth Circuit agreed with all the circuits that have ruled in
similar contexts and concluded that a mail bomb, whether functional or
dysfunctional, was a destructive weapon. Id. at 884.
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VI. MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES
A. Securities Fraud (15 U.S. C. § 78j(b), 78ff, Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5)
1. Same Facts Prosecutable as Both Wire and Securities Fraud.
"[There is no multiplicity issue when prosecuting the same purchase or sale
of securities under both the securities fraud statute and the wire fraud stat-
ute.t" United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 967 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 431 (1995).
2. Misappropriation Theory Rejected. "Manipulation and deception are
the touchstones of section 10(b) liability: . . . In essence the misappro-
priation theory disregards the specific statutory requirement of deception
... . Accordingly, we hold that criminal liability under section 10(b)
cannot be predicated upon the mere misappropriation of information in
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to one who is neither a purchaser nor seller
of securities, or in any other way connected with, or financially interested
in, an actual or proposed purchase or sale of securities, even when such a
breach is followed by the purchase or sale of securities. Such conduct
simply does not constitute fraud in connection with the purchase or .sale of
securities, within the meaning of section 10(b)." United States v. Bryan, 58
F.3d 933, 945 (4th Cir. 1995). In Bryan, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with
the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and overturned a securities fraud
conviction of a director of the West Virginia state lottery because there was
no deception in misappropriating nonpublic information relating to video
lottery contracts. Id. at 961. The Bryan court did not allow fraud and
perjury convictions to stand. Id.; see also United States v. ReBrook, 58
F.3d 961, 966 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995) (reversing
securities fraud conviction of West Virginia lottery official because there was
no deception and allowing wire fraud conviction to stand).
B. Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. § 703 et seq, 50 C.F.R. § 20.1
et seq.)
Misdemeanor violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act are strict
liability crimes. Consequently, the government does not have to prove
intent. United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 1995) (uphold-
ing conviction for hunting birds over scattered bait).
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C. Assimilated Crimes in National Parks (18 U.S.C. § 13, 36 C.F.R.
§ 4.2)
"[T]he United States may invoke the Assimilative Crimes Act [18
U.S.C. § 13] to prosecute an offense under state law [on federal property]
only when there is no enactment of Congress that punishes the offender."
United States v. Fox, 60 F.3d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1995). Concerning of-
fenses within national parks, the Congress provided legal authority for the
Department of the Interior to issue a criminal code: 36 C.F.R. § 1 et seq.
When any of those C.F.R. offenses apply, the government must charge them
and may not use the Assimilative Crimes Act. (Virginia state habitual
offenders law allowed to be assimilated because no identical C.F.R. of-
fense).
D. Dangerous Weapon Is Jury Question (18 U.S. C. § 113(a) (3))
Assault with a dangerous weapon on federal property is prohibited by
this statute. In United States v. Sturgis, 48 F.3d 784 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 107 (1995), the Fourth Circuit held that "what constitutes a
dangerous weapon depends not on the object's intrinsic character but on its
capacity, given 'the manner of its use,' to endanger life or inflict serious
physical harm." Id. at 787 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 324 F.2d 264,
266 (4th Cir. 1963)). "[D]etermination of whether a given instrumentality
was used as a 'dangerous weapon' must be left to the jury." Id. at 788. The
court specifically stated that body parts, including the teeth of an HIV-
infected person, could be dangerous weapons. The court cited with approval
a case wherein it was held that fists and feet can be dangerous weapons.
E. Intent to Deceive Is Immaterial (18 U.S. C. § 1001)
"[W]e have expressly held that intent to deceive is immaterial in a
prosecution under the general federal criminal fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1152 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing
Nilson Van & Storage Co. v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 362, 367 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985)). But cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1005, 1006,
1012, 1013 (requiring specific intent to deceive to be held criminally liable).
F. False Statement to Bank (18 U.S. C. § 1014)
1. Essential Elements. To prove its case, the government must show
that the defendant (1) made a false statement to a bank or similar institution,
(2) that the defendant made the false statement for the purpose of influencing
the actions of the bank, (3) that the statement was false as to a material fact,
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and (4) that the statement was made knowingly. United States v. Sparks, 67
F.3d 1145, 1151 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bonnette, 663 F.2d 495,
497 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982).
2. Intent to Deceive Is Immaterial. Like the similar 18 U.S.C. § 1001,
this statute contains no requirement that the government prove an intent to
deceive. United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1152 (4th Cir. 1995). But
cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1005, 1006, 1012, 1013 (requiring specific intent to
deceive to be held criminally liable).
G. Only Minimal Interstate Nexus Required in Possession of Document-
Making Implements (18 U.S.C. § 1028(a) (5))
Under this statute which prohibits the possession of implements and
machines for producing phony documents, only a minimal interstate (or
foreign) nexus is required. United States v. Pearce, 65 F.3d 22, 24 (4th
Cir. 1995) (upholding jury instruction which stated that nexus was proven
if any implements or their parts had crossed state line previously or if
intended use of implements would affect interstate commerce adversely).
H. Fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346)
1. Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) Stands Alone. The mail fraud statute
contains all the necessary elements for a criminal conviction. It does not
include a requirement that violations of other laws or regulations be proved.
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Wire Fraud (18 U.S. C. §§ 1343, 1346) Need Not Succeed. "The
gravamen of the offense of wire fraud is simply the execution of a 'scheme
to defraud."' It is not necessary for the fraud to succeed nor that gain be
realized. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted).
3. Confidential Information Is Property. "[C]onfidential information
is 'property,' the deprivation of which can constitute wire fraud." United
States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987)).
4. Public Corruption Is Prosecutable as Mail Fraud. In agreement
with other circuits, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Bryan, 58
F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995), that various kinds of dishonesty by public officials
are denials of the "honest services" of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 and therefore
prosecutable as mail fraud. In Bryan, the director of the West Virginia
Lottery used the mails to rig bids relating to the lottery.
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5. Same Analysis for Mail and Wire Fraud. "The wire fraud statute
tracks the language of the mail fraud statute .... The statutes are given a
similar construction and are subject to the same substantive analysis."
United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 967 n.6 (4th Cir.) (quoting Belt v.
United States, 868 F.2d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 431 (1995); see also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6
(1987)).
L Military Function Broadly Construed (18 U.S.C. § 1362)
Section 1362 prohibits damaging communication lines used for military
or civil defense functions. In the first case to address the scope of § 1362,
the Fourth Circuit broadly construed the statute and ruled that shipment by
rail of military material by a defense contractor is a military function and
that communication lines vital to such shipment are also used for a military
function. United States v. Turpin, 65 F.3d 1207, 1212 (4th Cir. 1995)
(examining language and legislative history of statute), cert. denied, 64
U.S.L.W. 3640 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-7260).
J. Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385)
"The purpose of this Act is to uphold the American tradition of restrict-
ing military intrusions into civilian affairs, except where Congress has
recognized a special need for military assistance in law enforcement ....
As a general matter, the exclusionary rule is not a remedy for violations of
the [Act]." United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 929-30 (4th Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted). In Al-Talib, the government used the Air Force to trans-
port a car and the drugs used in a sting operation. The Fourth Circuit found
that this use of the military had no direct impact on the defendants.
K. Two Types of Extortion (18 U.S.C. § 1951 (b)(2))
"The Act proscribes two types of extortion. The first requires proof
that the defendant induced payment by use of threats or fear. To prove
extortion by fear of economic harm, the government must establish that the
threat of such harm generated fear in the victim .... The second type of
extortion involves obtaining property from another under color of official
right. To prove this type of extortion the government need not show that the
defendant demanded or induced payment .... [W]e have stated that the
government must prove a quid pro quo when it charges extortion under color
of official right .... Neither type of extortion requires a direct benefit to
the extortionist. The 'gravamen of the offense is loss to the victim."'
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United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 365 (4th Cir.) (emphasis added)
(citations and internal quotations omitted) (upholding multiple counts of
conviction but overturning three counts because duplicative of other counts),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 124 (1995).
L. Money Laundering
1. "Specified Unlawful Activity" Need Not Be Elaborated Upon (18
U.S.C. § 1957(a)). "Just because the statute requires that funds be obtained
from 'specified' unlawful activity does not mean that the government is
required to detail [in the indictment] the circumstances of the unlawful
activity." United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1264 (4th Cir.) (holding
that it is sufficient to name wire fraud, without details, as specified unlawful
activity because it is one of such activities listed in statute and because "core
transaction" of money laundering is not illegal obtaining of funds used in
laundering), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995).
2. Completion of Specfied Unlawful Activity Is Question of Proof (18
U.S. C. § 1957(a)). In United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995), the defendant challenged the sufficiency of
the count in the indictment charging money laundering by asserting that the
specified unlawful activity - wire fraud - was not com-pleted when the
alleged money laundering took place. Therefore, the defendant argued that
the money had not yet been derived from an unlawful activity. The Fourth
Circuit doubted this contention as a matter of fact but ruled, nonetheless, that
it was an issue of proof for the finder of fact, not an issue of the legal
sufficiency of the indictment. Id. at 1264.
3. Elements of 18 U.S. C. § 1956(a) (1) Money Laundering. The essen-
tial elements of this version of money laundering are (1) a financial transac-
tion in interstate commerce, (2) the transaction involved proceeds of one of
the specified unlawful activities, (3) the defendant knew that the proceeds
were derived from the specified unlawful activity, and (4) the transaction
was intended to conceal or disguise the nature of the proceeds or to avoid the
transaction reporting requirements of state or federal law. United States v.
Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 318 (4th Cir. 1995) (sustaining conviction), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
M. Perjury (18 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1623)
1. Perjury Statute to Be Construed Narrowly (18 U.S.C. § 1623). The
Supreme Court requires the lower courts "to construe the perjury statute
narrowly." United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 960 (4th Cir. 1995); see
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also Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360-62 (1973) (concluding
that "the perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the statute in-
voked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner -
so long as the witness speaks the literal truth . . . precise questioning is
imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury"); United States v.
Heater, 63 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming perjury conviction because
questions were neither vague nor misleading), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796
(1996); United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 376 (4th Cir.) (overturning
perjury conviction because prosecutor's questions were not specific enough),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 124 (1995).
2. Subornation of Pejury Does Not Require Physical Threats or
Coercion (18 U.S.C. § 1622). "[Tjhis court has never included actual
physical coercion as an element of subornation of perjury .... A defendant
can [procure or] 'instigate' without making threats of physical harm."
United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding conviction),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
N. Cigarette-Lighter Bomb Is Nonmailable Matter (18 U.S. C. § 1716)
Under this postal statute, devices that may ignite or explode are among
the devices that are classified as "nonmailable." In United States v. Ham-
rick, 43 F.3d 877 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 90 (1995),
the Fourth Circuit ruled that a possibly dysfunctional bomb (even if it could
not explode) may have ignited because it was constructed with cigarette
lighters containing butane. Id. at 884.
0. Proof of "Credit Union" Is Essential to Credit-Union Robbery (18
U.S.C. § 2113)
In a prosecution for robbery of a federally insured credit union, it was
error for the trial court to instruct conclusively the jury that the place robbed
was a credit union under the statute. United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 139,
143 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that although government conceded error on
appeal, it argued unsuccessfully that error was harmless beyond reasonable
doubt).
P. Video Hearing Approved for Involuntary Commitment (18 U.S. C.
§ 4245)
In United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 114 (1995), the Fourth Circuit approved, against constitutional and
statutory challenges, an involuntary commitment hearing pursuant to 18
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U.S.C. § 4245 that was conducted as part of a pilot program by video
transmission between the judge and the prosecutor in a courtroom and the
defendant and his attorney at a psychiatric facility.
Q. Obstructing the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 7212(a))
Actions, even if they are not illegal per se, that are intended, even if
unsuccessful, to corruptly impede the administration of the Internal Revenue
Code are proscribed by 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). The word "corruptly" in this
statute is to be construed broadly. United States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474,
478 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing defendant's attempt to evade tax lien on real
estate by filing lis pendens against property in favor of his wife), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 929 (1996); see United States v. Mitchell, 985 F.2d 1275
(4th Cir. 1993) (analyzing § 7212(a)).
R. Money Structuring (31 U.S. C. § 5324)
In its decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994), the
Supreme Court ruled that in order to prove the required "willful" violation
of the statute, the government must show that the defendant knew that his
conduct was unlawful under the statute. United States v. Gray, 47 F.3d
1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1995).
S. False Social Security Number (42 U.S. C. § 408(a) (7) (B))
"The elements of that offense are that the defendant (1) falsely repre-
sented a number to be her social security number (2) with the intent to
deceive another person (3) for the purpose of obtaining something of value."
United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1152 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that
facts in case showed that defendant intended to deceive).
VII. TRIAL
A. Indictment
1. Sufficiency: Tracking Statute Is Usually Sufficient (Fed. R. Crim. P.
7(c)). "When considering whether an indictment properly charges an
offense, we are guided by basic principles that (1) the indictment must
contain a statement of 'the essential facts constituting the offense charged,'
(2) it must contain allegations of each element of the offense charged, so that
the defendant is given fair notice of the charge that he must defend, and
(3) its allegations must be sufficiently distinctive so that an acquittal or
conviction on such charges can be pleaded to bar a second prosecution for
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the same offense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1); .... The allegations of
an offense are generally sufficient if stated in the words of the statute itself."
United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1263-64 (4th Cir.) (citations omitted)
(finding money laundering indictment sufficient), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1970 (1995).
2. Sufficiency: Each Count Considered Separately. "If an indictment
contains multiple counts, each count is viewed as a separate indictment for
purposes of determining its sufficiency." United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d
1259, 1264 (4th Cir.) (citations omitted) (noting that sections of other counts
may be incorporated into another count), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970
(1995).
3. Variance Between Indictment and Proof (Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)).
A variance between indictment and proof that does not "affect substantial
rights" of the defendant will be disregarded. "So long as the defendant has
been informed of the charges against him and is able to present a defense
without being taken by surprise by evidence offered at trial, . . . there will
have been no substantial infringement of rights." United States v. Heater,
63 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (disregarding variance
in purchase price of item in money laundering indictment), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 796 (1996).
B. Voir Dire
1. Broad Discretion in District Court. "[T]he district court has broad
discretion in the conduct of voir dire and will be reversed only for an abuse
of discretion." United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 969 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995); see also United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311
(4th Cir. 1995) (allowing broad discretion over phrasing of questions asked
and noting that court is not obliged to ask each question proposed by defend-
ant), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
2. Contemporaneous Objection Required. "Where the defendant fails
specifically to object to the manner in which the district court conducted voir
dire, as here, we review the issue for plain error affecting substantial
rights." United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 969 (4th Cir.) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995).
3. Individual Voir Dire Not a Right. In United States v. ReBrook, 58
F.3d 961 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995), the district court
conducted voir dire exclusively. The defendant argued that he had a right
to question potential jurors directly because of extensive pretrial publicity
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concerning the case. The Fourth Circuit disagreed and pointed out that the
record showed that the trial court had itself carefully dealt with the adverse
publicity issue. See also United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 734 (4th
Cir. 1991) ("It is well settled that a trial judge may conduct voir dire without
allowing counsel to pose questions directly to the potential jurors. ").
4. Standard for Prosecutorial Rebuttal to Batson Challenge. Under
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the prosecutor may not strike a
juror solely on account of race. When the defense raises a prima facie
challenge to a strike, the prosecution must rebut the challenge by showing
racially neutral reasons that must not be "intrinsically suspect" and must be
"adequately supported by observable fact." United States v. Johnson, 54
F.3d 1150, 1163 (4th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044,
1049 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing prosecution's rebuttal of challenge by
showing criminal activity of husband of one juror and potential bias of
another juror), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995).
5. Trial Court Has Discretion to Dismiss Jurors. The trial court's
refusal to dismiss a particular juror is reviewed on appeal for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1104 (4th Cir. 1995)
(noting that juror who expressed doubts about his impartiality later con-
firmed that he would be impartial), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-7022
(U.S. Dec. 4, 1995).
C. Jencks Act (18 U.S. C. § 3500, Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2)
1. Jencks Act Applies Only ta Statements in Prosecution's Possession.
If the defense makes a request, the prosecution is responsible for turning
over to the defense any statements of its witnesses "in its possession" after
their testimonies. United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1103 (4th Cir.
1995), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1995). Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2 extends the same right to the prosecution.
2. Rules for Hearings on Jencks Act Requests. If the government
refuses a defendant's Jencks' Act request for production of witnesses'
statements, the trial court must hold an "independent inquiry," but the extent
of the inquiry is at the discretion of the court. Frequently, the court inspects
the statements in camera, but the defendant must "provide some foundation"
before such an inspection is necessary. The trial court's ruling on whether
statements must be turned over to the opposing party is a factual one and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Boyd,
53 F.3d 631, 634 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 322 (1995).
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D. Civil Rulings Not Dispositive in Criminal Proceedings
"As a general rule, evidence of a determination made in a civil action
where the party with the burden of persuasion must establish facts only by
a preponderance of the evidence is not admissible to prove an element of a
criminal prosecution where the government must establish elements of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Bostian, 59
F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 929 (1996).
E. Prosecutorial Misconduct
1. Test for Improper Closing Argument. "First, the prosecutor's
comments must, in fact, have been improper. Second, the remarks must
have so prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights that the defendant was
denied a fair trial .... Factors to be considered under this [second] prong
of the analysis include: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks
have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether
the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength
of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and
(4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert
attention to extraneous matters." United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907,
913 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (holding that
prosecutor's reference to fact not in evidence and prosecutor's false state-
ment that defendant had confessed were both improper but harmless because
of curative instructions and strong evidence of guilt), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 749 (1996); see also United States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776, 780 (4th Cir.
1995) (concluding that prosecutor's use of "I think" several times in closing
argument was innocuous).
2. Prosecutorial Use of Perjured Testimony Must Be Knowing.
To violate the due process rights of the defendant, it must be shown that
the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury. United States
v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264, 269 (1959)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 925 (1996).
3. Coercion of Witnesses. In United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995), the Fourth Circuit ruled that
the government did not intimidate or coerce a witness when it attempted to
sift out inconsistencies in her testimony and to caution her about her obliga-
tion to testify truthfully. The Court stated that "[a]lthough a defendant has
a right to unhampered testimony in his defense, . . . he has no right to
perjured testimony." Id. at 151 (citations omitted).
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F. Earlier Proceedings and Rulings Not Basis for Judicial Recusal (28
U.S. C. § 455(a))
A party may not successfully challenge a judge's impartiality simply on
the basis that the judge formed opinions from earlier proceedings or earlier
rulings in the case. United States v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir.
1995); see also Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994) (stating that
partiality requires wrongful or inappropriate disposition toward party).
G. Judicial Bias
1. Judge Must Appear Unbiased. The presiding judge in a criminal
trial must not only be impartial but also must give the appearance of impar-
tiality. Although he may question witnesses directly under Federal Rules of
Evidence 614(b), the judge may not undermine the appearance of impartial-
ity by continuously intervening on one side. Nevertheless, Federal Rule of
Evidence 611(a) allows the court to control the interrogation of witnesses to
make effective ascertainment of truth, to avoid the waste of time, and to
protect witnesses from harassment or embarrassment. United States v.
Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1272 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no judicial bias).
2. When Judge Must Recuse Himself (28 U.S. C. § 455). According to
28 U.S.C. § 455, a presiding judge must recuse himself from a case when
in private practice he or his partners had served as a lawyer in the matter
currently in controversy or whenever his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. In United States v. Walton, 56 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 1995), the
Fourth Circuit ruled that recusal was not required even though the law firm
in which the trial judge was a former partner had represented the defendant
in drug cases four times in the 1970s.
H. Admissibility of Evidence
1. Multiple Theories. "[S]imply because evidence might be inadmissi-
ble on one ground, it does not follow that the evidence is not admissible
under other theories." United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1466 n.6 (4th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 784 (1996).
2. District Court May Be Upheld on Different Grounds. "[E]ven if the
grounds that the district court gave for admitting the evidence are improper,
generally this Court will reverse only if there are no grounds upon which the
district court could have properly admitted the evidence." United States v.
Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1156 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266
(1995).
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3. Relevance (Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402). "Evidence is relevant if it has
'any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."' United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 636 (4th Cir.)
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 322 (1995).
L Cross-Examination
1. Cross-Examination Limited to Relevant Matters. The trial court may
limit the scope of cross-examination on relevancy grounds. "A defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination is limited to issues that are
relevant to his trial, and the district court has broad discretion to determine
which issues are relevant." United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1470
(4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 784 (1996).
2. Trial Judge Has Broad Latitude to Control Cross-Examination.
There is a "broad latitude afforded a trial judge in controlling cross-exanina-
tion." United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 918 n.10 (4th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996).
3. Defendant May Not Immunize His Witness from Cross-Examination.
"'The defendant's right to present witnesses in his own defense, however,
does not carry with it the right to immunize the witness from reasonable and
appropriate cross-examination.' Lawson v. Murray, 837 F.2d 653, 655 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988). This court has always considered
cross-examination to be 'an indispensable tool in the search for truth,' id. at
656, and the Fifth Amendment cannot be used selectively to provide a
witness with immunity from cross-examination." United States v. Heater,
63 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir. 1995) (defendant sought to limit the govern-
ment's cross-examination of his witness who was facing a perjury charge in
a separate trial), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
J. Prejudicial Generalizations Based on Nationality: "Jamaicans"
Defendants may be identified by their nationality - for instance, as
Jamaicans - when the identification is relevant and has "more than marginal
probative value." United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239, 1244 (4th Cir.)
(holding that defendants failed to show how reference to them as Jamaicans
was prejudicial), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 346 (1995).
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K. "Just Cause" to Refuse to Testify (28 U.S.C. § 1826(a))
Under this statute, a district court may hold in contempt and incarcerate
a witness who refuses to testify, but the statute allows witnesses a "just
cause" defense to contempt. The Supreme Court has held that illegal gov-
ernment surveillance of a witness is an example of such just cause. In re
Askin, 47 F.3d 100, 102 (4th Cir.) (citing Gelbard v. United States, 408
U.S. 41 (1972)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 382 (1995).
L. Testimony Regarding Voice Identification
A proper foundation must be laid before a witness may testify that he
recognizes the voice of someone else. The witness may not come to his
recognition through impermissibly suggestive means. United States v.
Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290 (4th Cir.) (agent testified that he recognized the
defendant's voice on audio tape because of his interactions with the defen-
dant over a period of one year), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 400 (1995).
M. In-Court Identifications
1. "Suggestive" Photo Displays and Later In-Court Identifications. In
United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit
considered a concededly suggestive photo display wherein the only Cauca-
sian was the defendant. Four witnesses who had been shown the display
later identified the defendant in court. The court of appeals upheld the in-
court identification because all four witnesses stated that they knew the
defendant independently of the photo display. The court stated that the
burden is on the government to show by clear and convincing evidence that
the identification is based upon personal observations or familiarity, rather
than upon any photo displays or lineups. Each case must be considered on
its own facts and under the totality of the circumstances. "The extent to
which the witnesses knew Burgos is a factual determination reviewed for
clear error only; legal conclusions reached by the district court concerning
the legitimacy of the in-court identification are reviewed de novo." Id. at
941.
In United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth
Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
in-court identifications after an earlier photo display that the defendant
claimed had been unduly suggestive. The court noted that the witnesses
were positive in their identifications and had seen the defendant closely in
broad daylight. The court also noted that there was no inherent prejudice in
allowing the witnesses to see the defendant before their testimonies on the
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day of the trial. "Eyewitness identification at trial following an earlier
pretrial photographic identification is permissible unless the photo line-up
procedure is 'so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification."' Id. at 1168 (citations omitted).
2. Independent In-Court Identifications: Standard of Review. When the
prosecution does not introduce evidence of out-of-court identifications, it
must show by clear and convincing evidence under the totality of the circum-
stances that an in-court identification was based on the witness's independent
knowledge or recollection of the defendant's appearance. United States v.
Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding in-court identifications),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996).
N. Tape Recordings and Transcripts
1. Trial Court Has Latitude over Foundation. "Upon review, we will
not find error unless the foundation for admission [of a tape recording] is
clearly insufficient to insure the accuracy of the recording." United States
v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1106 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that jury can resolve
any issue over reliability of identification of parties on tape), petition for
cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1995).
2. Transcripts Normally Permissible. The trial court has discretion
over whether to allow the use of transcripts during the playing of tapes. The
court must give a limiting instruction that the tapes are the evidence and the
transcripts are only aids in understanding the tapes. Both sides have the
right to prepare transcripts. United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100 (4th Cir.
1995), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1995).
0. When Admissible Evidence May Be Excluded (Rule 403)
1. When Excluded. "[O]therwise admissible evidence may be properly
excluded under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury." United
States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 815 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2631
(1995). Because "in one sense all incriminating evidence is inherently
prejudicial," the question is whether the evidence is unduly prejudicial.
United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir.) (evidence of drug use not
unduly prejudicial when compared to drug trafficking evidence admitted
against defendant), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 322 (1995).
2. When Prejudice Is Fair. "'Unfair prejudice' does not include within
its purview the damage done to a defendant's case which arises from the
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'legitimate probative force of the evidence."' United States v. Heater, 63
F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W.
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5215, at 275 (1978)), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
3. Trial Court's Rule 403 Ruling Will Almost Always Be Upheld. "A
court's decision to admit evidence will not be upset by a Rule 403 challenge
except under the most extraordinary circumstances where that discretion is
plainly abused." United States v. Ricco, 52 F.3d 58, 61 (4th Cir.) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 254 (1995).
P. Evidence of Prior Bad Acts (Fed. R. Evid. 404(b))
1. A Broad, Inclusive Rule. "The purposes for which prior bad acts
may be admitted under Rule 404(b) is illustrative rather than exclusionary.
United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1203 (4th Cir. 1985). Consequently
we have construed the exceptions to the inadmissibility of prior bad acts
evidence broadly, and characterize Rule 404(b) 'as an inclusive rule, admit-
ting all evidence of other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove
only criminal disposition.' Id. (emphasis added). United States v. Russell,
971 F.2d 1098, 1106 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that 'evidence of prior bad
acts is admissible unless it is introduced for the sole purpose of proving
criminal disposition'), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1013 (1993)." United States
v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1464 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 784
(1996).
2. Four-Part Test for Admissibility. In United States v. Powers, 59
F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 784 (1996), the Fourth
Circuit elaborated upon its four-part test for the admissibility of Rule 404(b)
evidence. See also United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1988).
Concerning relevance, the court said that "[t]he threshold for relevancy is
relatively low . . . [the 404(b) evidence] 'must be sufficiently related to the
charged offense."' Powers, 59 F.3d at 1465 (quoting Rawle, 845 F.2d at
1247 n.3). The court also stated that when there is a relevancy issue of
whether the 404(b) evidence is adequately related in time to the charged
offense, the decision is within the district court's discretion. "We are
especially reluctant to reverse the district court on this ground." Id. at 1466.
Concerning necessity, the court said that 404(b) evidence can be necessary
in various ways: when it is an essential part of the crime; is part of the
context, setting, or environment of the crime; completes the story of the
crime; or is intimately related to or explanatory of the crime. Concerning
reliability, the court stated that the testimony of three 404(b) eyewitnesses
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was sufficient to allow a jury to "reasonably conclude that the act[s] occurred
and that the defendant was the actor." Id. at 1467 (quoting Huddleston v.
United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988)). Concerning whether the 404(b)
evidence was "substantially" more probative than prejudicial, the court
found that the particular evidence in the case was "highly" probative and that
the limiting instruction given was adequate. "As to prejudicial effect, we
note that cautionary or limiting instructions generally obviate any such
prejudice particularly if the danger of prejudice is slight in view of over-
whelming evidence of guilt." Id. at 1468 (citation omitted).
3. Rule 404(b) Evidence in Significant Sexual Abuse Case. In United
States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 784
(1996), the Fourth Circuit considered a sexual abuse conviction in which the
defendant's prior acts of physical violence against the victim and her family
were admitted as Rule 404(b) evidence. The Fourth Circuit noted that
Powers was apparently the first federal case in which Rule 404(b) evidence
had been admitted in such a context. Calling the case "a close question" that
"pushes the boundaries of Rule 404(b)," id. at 1469, the Court found the
evidence admissible under its four-part test for admissibility of 404(b)
evidence. See Four-Part Testfor Admissibility, supra, § 2; United States v.
Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1988). The evidence was (1) relevant
because it explained why the victim delayed in reporting the sexual abuse;
(2) necessary because it helped to explain the setting and context of the
crime; (3) reliable because there were three eyewitnesses who testified to it;
and (4) substantially more probative than prejudicial because it was "highly
probative," Powers, 59 F.3d at 1467, and an adequate limiting instruction
was given.
4. Evidence Upheld or Rejected.
Admission Upheld. In a prosecution of a pharmacist for illegally
distributing controlled substances, the testimony of a customer that the
pharmacist had given her numerous illegal prescriptions over a period of five
years before the charged offense "was relevant to show the defendant's
modus operandi." United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231, 237 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 925 (1996).
Admission Upheld. In a case involving incestuous sexual abuse, prior
acts of physical violence against the victim and other members of the family
showed the setting and context of the sexual abuse and explained the delay
of the victim in reporting the abuse. United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460
(4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 784 (1996).
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Admission Upheld. In a drug conspiracy prosecution, evidence about
a drug deal involving the defendant occurring after the conclusion of all the
conduct alleged in the conspiracy was admissible to establish the identity of
the defendant who had used several aliases and denied involvement in the
crime. United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 749 (1996).
Admission Upheld. Tax returns offered by the government to rebut
defendant's contention that his lifestyle was not that of a drug dealer were
not impermissible character evidence, but rather constituted impeachment
evidence. United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 322 (1995).
Admission Upheld. Evidence of defendant's marijuana and cocaine use
was admissible to prove his motive for participating in a drug conspiracy and
to prove the nature of his relationship with a co-conspirator. Because his
drug use was less sensational than the drug trafficking charge that he was
facing, the evidence was not more prejudicial than probative. United States
v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 322 (1995).
5. Standard of Review on Appeal. Abuse of discretion is the standard
of review on appeal, and a trial court's decision to admit or exclude Rule
404(b) evidence will not be overturned on appeal unless it was "arbitrary or
irrational." United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231, 237 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 925 (1996); United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1464
(4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 784 (1996); United States v. Boyd,
53 F.3d 631 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 322 (1995).
Q. Victim's Other Sexual Conduct (Fed. R. Evid. 412)
In United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 784 (1996), the Fourth Circuit upheld the exclusion, on relevancy
grounds, of evidence of a sexual abuse victim's other sexual conduct because
that conduct occurred more than a year after the rape of the victim by the
defendant.
R. Marital Privilege: Two Types (Fed. R. Evid. 501)
"There are two types of marital privilege: the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony and the privilege of protecting confidential marital com-
munications. The adverse spousal privilege is vested in the witness-spouse,
who may neither be compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying ....
The 'marital communication privilege,' if applicable and properly raised, is
with the defendant and prevents a spouse from testifying against the defen-
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dant regarding confidential communications between the spouses." Id. at
514. Both types require a valid marriage. United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d
509, 515 (4th Cir. 1995) (privilege denied because cohabitation was not
statutory or common-law marriage).
S. Summary-of-Testimony Charts Admissible Under Fed. R. Evid. 611 (a)
In a drug conspiracy with many witnesses and extensive evidence, a
trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence a chart
summarizing previous testimony as long as the chart aids the jury in ascer-
taining the truth and the defendant has a sufficient opportunity to cross-
examine the chart and its preparer. In such a case, the trial court is exercis-
ing "reasonable control over the mode ... of ... presenting evidence," as
allowed by Rule 611(a). United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1158 (4th
Cir.) (holding that agent's calculation of drug amounts was admissible;
however, chart was not admissible in ordinary drug prosecution), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995).
T. Expert Testimony (Fed. R. Evid. 702)
1. Standard for Admission into Evidence. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court changed the
standard for admission of expert testimony from the traditional Frye "general
acceptance" standard to a Federal Rules of Evidence-based "relevant and
reliable" standard. In United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2631 (1995), the Fourth Circuit construed the new
standard to mean: (1) the expert testimony must be supported by appropriate
validation; and (2) the evidence or testimony must assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. "In determining
whether certain expert evidence properly satisfies the first 'scientific knowl-
edge' prong of the two-part test, the Court held that trial courts may consider
several factors: (1) whether the theory or technique used by the expert can
be, and has been, tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of
error of the method used; and (4) the degree of the method's or conclusion's
acceptance within the relevant scientific community." Daubert, 113 S. Ct.
at 2796-97. "In determining whether the evidence meets the second prong
of the two-part test - that is, whether the evidence will be helpful to the
trier of fact - the Supreme Court warned that throughout an admissibility
determination, a judge must be mindful of other evidentiary rules, such as
FRE 403, which permits the exclusion of relevant evidence 'if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
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sion of the issues, or misleading the jury."' Dorsey, 45 F.3d at 813 (quoting
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798).
2. Defendant's Surprise Expert Witness. In United States v. Dorsey,
45 F.3d 809 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2631 (1995), the Fourth
Circuit stated that the defendant's notification to the government on thefirst
day of trial of its intent to present expert testimony was "a formidable reason
in itself" to exclude the testimony. Id. at 816. The court observed that the
defendant's late notice substantially prejudiced the government in its ability
to rebut the testimony with expert testimony of its own. The court cited with
approval United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992)
(excluding evidence when defendant gave government four days' notice),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 947 (1993), and United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d
114, 118 (3d Cir. 1988) (excluding evidence when defendant gave govern-
ment five days' notice).
3. Anthropologists' Analysis of Bank Photographs for Mistaken Identity
Not Scientific Knowledge. In United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2631 (1995), the defendant, relying on a
defense of mistaken identity, had proposed to present two forensic anthropol-
ogists who would have testified that the man depicted in bank surveillance
photographs was not the defendant. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony on account of
its questionable character as "scientific" knowledge, because the comparison
of photographs can be adequately done by the jury, because its effect would
be to usurp the jury's prerogative to evaluate the credibility of other wit-
nesses, because the proposed testimony might confuse and mislead the jury
under Fed. R. Evid. 403, and because the defendant gave tardy notice to the
government of its intent to use such evidence.
4. Penile Plethysmograph Not Scientific Evidence. The penile plethys-
mograph is a test that is supposed to measure whether a man's sexual arousal
is normal or abnormal. In United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 784 (1996), the defendant offered the test as
proof that he did not have the characteristics of a pedophile. The trial court
exercised its discretion to exclude the test, and the Fourth Circuit upheld the
exclusion, saying that the scientific validity of the test had not been proven.
5. Psychological Profile for Pedophilia Excluded. In United States v.
Powers, 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 784 (1996),
the defendant, charged with incestuous sexual abuse, offered the expert
testimony of a psychologist that he did not demonstrate the psychological
profile of a fixated pedophile (someone who sexually prefers children). The
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trial court exercised its discretion to exclude the testimony, and the Fourth
Circuit upheld the exclusion on relevancy grounds. The circuit court pointed
out that because only a percentage of child abusers were identifiable as
fixated pedophiles, even if the defendant were shown not to be a fixated
pedophile, the evidence did not necessarily prove anything. The defendant
failed to show, the circuit concluded, a relevant causal link between fixated
pedophilia and the crime charged - incest child abuse.
U. Prior Testimony May Not Be Summarized as "Expert Knowledge" (Fed.
R. Evid. 703)
"Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows an expert witness to
base his opinion upon earlier trial testimony. However, this Rule does not
afford the expert unlimited license to testify or present a chart in a manner
that simply summarizes the testimony of others without first relating that
testimony to some 'specialized knowledge' on the expert's part as required
under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence." United States v. John-
son, 54 F.3d 1150, 1157 (4th Cir.) (holding chart admissible under Fed. R.
Evid. 611(a)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995).
V. Hearsay
1. Confrontation Clause v. Hearsay Exceptions. "When evidence is
admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, a court can 'infer [ ] with-
out more' that it is sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause.... But the Clause requires 'a showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness' before all other hearsay can be admitted. . . .This
trustworthiness requirement - which serves as a surrogate for the declar-
ant's in-court cross-examination - is satisfied if the court can conclude that
cross-examination would be of 'marginal utility."' United States v. Shaw,
69 F.3d 1249, 1253 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805,
820 (1990)); see also United States v. Bumpass, 60 F.3d 1099, 1102 (4th
Cir. 1995) (holding that Confrontation Clause is satisfied when "cross-
examination would add little to test the hearsay's reliability"), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 925 (1996).
2. Admission of Co-Conspirator's Statement (Fed. R. Evid.
801(d) (2) (E)). "Rule 801(d)(2)(E) allows the admission of hearsay if the
district court finds by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there was a
conspiracy involving the declarant and the party against whom the statement
is offered and (2) that the declarant's statement was made during the course
of and in furtherance of a conspiracy." United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d
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1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 1995) (allowing admission of statement of deceased co-
conspirator), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1995).
3. Impeachment Must Occur Before Prior Consistent Statement Admit-
ted (Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)). In United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137
(4th Cir. 1995), the testifying defendant tried to introduce his prior consis-
tent statement before his testimony had been impeached. The Fourth Circuit
upheld the trial court's sustaining of the government's objection. In United
States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 1995), a government witness testified
to a prior consistent statement merely as a general corroboration of an earlier
government witness. The government made no attempt to offer the state-
ment as a rebuttal to a recent fabrication, as required by the rule. The
Fourth Circuit was unable to find the error harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt because the jury below had acquitted the defendant of two of the four
bank robberies with which she had been charged. The court of appeals
reversed the convictions on the other two robberies and ordered a new trial.
4. Test for Trustworthiness of Residual Exceptions to Hearsay Rule
(Fed. R. Evid. 803(24), 804(b)(5)). "Trustworthiness must emanate from
the circumstances of a hearsay statement, not from its consistency with other
evidence offered in the case." United States v. Shaw, 69 F.3d 1249, 1253
n.5 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding trustworthiness).
5. Corroboration of Unavailable Witness's Statement Against Interest
(Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (3)). When a witness is unavailable, the admission ("a
formidable burden") of his statement against interest may turn on whether
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate that the statement is trustwor-
thy. In United States v. Bumpass, 60 F.3d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3486 (U.S. Dec. 26, 1995) (No. 95-1076), the
Fourth Circuit stated that "[tihe level of corroboration ... must be sufficient
that cross examination would add little to test the hearsay's reliability," and
further elaborated on factors that may be considered in assessing reliability:
"(1) whether the declarant had at the time of making the statement pled
guilty or was still exposed to prosecution for making the statement, (2) the
declarant's motive in making the statement and whether there was a reason
for the declarant to lie, (3) whether the declarant repeated the statement and
did so consistently, (4) the party or parties to whom the statement was made,
(5) the relationship of the declarant with the accused, and (6) the nature and
strength of independent evidence relevant to the conduct in question." Id. at
1102 (upholding district court's exclusion of statement offered by and
purportedly exculpating defendant). "When assessing the corroborating
circumstances of a statement, a court can make an assessment of the evi-
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dence." United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137, 1146 (4th Cir. 1995) (uphold-
ing district court's exclusion of statement of defendant's witness).
6. Test for Residual Exception When Declarant Is Unavailable (Fed. R.
Evid. 804(b)(5)). "To admit hearsay under the residual exception created by
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), the district court must find that (1) the
declarant is unavailable; (2) the statement bears circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness equivalent to those that warrant the admission of hearsay
under the other exceptions enumerated in Rule 804; (3) the statement relates
to a material fact; (4) the statement is more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other reasonably obtainable evidence; (5) the interests
of justice are served by the statement's admission; and (6) the offering party
has provided the opposing party reasonable notice before trial of its intention
to use the statement." United States v. Shaw, 69 F.3d 1249 (4th Cir. 1995)
(finding evidence admissible).
7. Distinguishing Between Hearsay and Nonhearsay Uses of Evidence.
In United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
431 (1995), the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial court's rulings allowing
limited references to newspaper articles introduced by the defense in a
securities and wire fraud prosecution. Id. at 969. The defense theory of
admission was that the newspaper articles established information that was
available to the public. Id. at 967. The trial court properly limited the use
of the articles because the content of the articles was hearsay. Id. at 968.
W. Chain of Custody (Fed. R. Evid. 901(a))
1. Chain of Custody Is Only One Method of Authentication. "The
authentication requirement of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires only
that a party introducing evidence demonstrate that the evidence is in fact
what its proponent claims. Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). The 'chain of custody'
rule is simply a variation of this principle." United States v. Turpin, 65 F.3d
1207, 1213 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that challenge to evidence went to its
weight, not to its authenticity), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3640 (U.S. Mar.
25, 1996) (No. 95-7260).
2. "Missing Link" Is Not Necessarily Fatal. The "'chain of custody'
is not an iron-clad requirement, and the fact of a 'missing link' does not
prevent the admission of real evidence, so long as there is sufficient proof
that the evidence is what it purports to be and has not been altered in any
material respect." United States v. Ricco, 52 F.3d 58, 61-62 (4th Cir.)
(finding authentication sufficient) (citing United States v. Howard-Arias, 679
F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 254 (1995).
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X. Note-Taking by Jurors
It is within the discretion of the court to allow jurors to take notes.
They should be instructed that their notes are not evidence and that their
notes should not take precedence over their independent recollection of the
proceedings. United States v. Wild, 47 F.3d 669, 672 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 128 (1995).
Y. Jury Misconduct: Defendant Bears Initial Burden of Showing Improper
Contact Between Juror and Parties
"In Stockton, we emphasized that the defendant bears the initial burden
of demonstrating that an improper contact occurred. Only if such contact is
established must the government demonstrate the absence of prejudice. A
mere proffer without further support is not enough to create a question about
improper jury tampering." United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 321-22
(4th Cir. 1995) (noting that court will not go on "fishing expedition"), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
Z. Defenses
1. Ignorance of Law Is No Defense. Ignorance of the law generally is
no defense to a criminal charge. United States v. Forbes, 64 F.3d 928, 932
n.4 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Mistake of Law Is No Defense. Except for good-faith reliance on the
advice of an actual expert or government official with actual authority,
mistake of law is no defense to a criminal charge. United States v. Sparks,
67 F.3d 1145, 1152-53 n.4 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no detrimental reliance
on expert or official).
3. Legal Impossibility, Definition. "The defense of legal impossibility
is available where the defendant's acts, even if fully carried out as intended,
would not constitute a crime." United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877, 885
(4th Cir.) (holding that defense of legal impossibility was contradicted by
facts), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 90 (1995).
4. Factual Impossibility Is No Defense In Attempt Crime. "Factual
impossibility exists 'where the objective is proscribed by the criminal law
but a factual circumstance unknown to the actor prevents him from bringing
it about.' United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1975).
However, factual impossibility is traditionally not a defense to a charge of
attempt, and we now join those circuits that have expressly held that it is not
a defense to an attempt crime." United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877, 885
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(4th Cir.) (finding possibly dysfunctional bomb no defense to attempted
murder charge), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 90 (1995).
5. Government May Solicit But Not Entrap. "As we stated in Daniel,
inducement involves elements of governmental overreaching and conduct
sufficiently excessive to implant a criminal design in the mind of an other-
wise innocent party, whereas, on the other hand, solicitation simply is the
provision of an opportunity to commit a criminal act." United States v.
Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1189 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotations
omitted) (holding that defendant was not entrapped because he readily
committed the criminal act).
6. Standard for Justification Defense. "The defendant must produce
evidence which would allow the factfinder to conclude that he (1) was under
unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) did not
recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced to engage
in criminal conduct; (3) had no reasonable legal alternative (to both the
criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm); and (4) a direct
causal relationship between the criminal action and the avoidance of the
threatened harm." United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873-74 (4th Cir.)
(citing United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1989))
(holding that justification for possession of firearm by felon will be con-
strued very narrowly), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2287 (1995).
AA. Jury Instructions
1. No Definition of "Reasonable Doubt." In 1995, the Fourth Circuit
again reiterated its long-standing rule that the district courts should not
attempt to define "reasonable doubt." United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d
1290, 1300 (4th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42, 46
(4th Cir.) (holding that court was not obliged to give definition of reasonable
doubt even when jury asks for one), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2679 (1994).
2. No "Missing Witness" Instruction When Witness Is Available to Both
Sides. In United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78 (4th Cir. 1995), the defendant
appealed the trial court's denial of his request for a "missing witness"
instruction. Id. at 81. Under such an instruction, if a party has failed to call
a relevant witness, the jury may consider that the witness's testimony would
have been unfavorable to the party that did not call the witness. The Fourth
Circuit ruled that no instruction was required since the missing witness was
equally available to both sides. 1d.
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3. Requested Jury Instructions Must Be Supported By Evidence. A
party is entitled to a jury instruction only when there is evidence in the
record to support the instruction. Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1354
(4th Cir. 1995). In Kornahrens, the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant
charged with murder had no right to an instruction about lesser degrees of
homicide because the record did not support it. Id. at 1354-55.
4. Failure To Instruct Jury on Essential Element Is Constitutional
Error, Almost Always Requiring Reversal. "Failure to instruct the jury that
it must make an essential finding is therefore a constitutional error, and we
must reverse the conviction unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.... [Flailing to instruct the jury on an essential element will rarely
be harmless." United States v. Forbes, 64 F.3d 928, 934-35 (4th Cir. 1995)
(finding rare example of harmless constitutional error); see also United
States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding error not harmless);
United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that deficient
conspiracy instruction was not harmless).
5. Error in Reasonable Doubt Instruction Can Never Be Harmless.
"[T]he harmless-error doctrine cannot save a constitutionally deficient
-reasonable doubt instruction." Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175, 178 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2281 (1995).
6. Allen Charge Must Be Balanced. An Allen charge is a supplemental
jury instruction requiring members of a deadlocked jury to give deference
to each other's views. In United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 935 (4th
Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit explicitly stiffened its standard of review from
previous cases. "It is critical that an Allen charge not coerce one side or the
other into changing its position for the sake of unanimity.... [R]egardless
of what other specifics are included in an Allen charge given to a deadlocked
jury, a district court must incorporate a specific reminder both to jurors in
the minority and those in the majority that they reconsider their positions in
light of the other side's views. Such an instruction applies equally to each
juror, regardless of whether that person is alone in dissent or is part of a
substantial majority. Failure to provide a sufficiently balanced charge will
result in reversal." United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir.
1995) (overturning conviction because Allen charge acted as coercion on
jurors in minority).
7. Conflicting Jury Instructions: When Retrial Is Required. When final
jury instructions are conflicting and erroneous, a retrial may be required.
When a final instruction conflicts with a prior limiting instruction, the final
instruction controls, and retrial is probably not necessary. United States v.
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Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1469 n.9 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
784 (1996).
8. Supplemental Argument After Supplemental Instruction. If the trial
court gives a supplemental jury instruction that presents a new theory of the
case, it may be error for the court to deny the defendant another chance to
argue. However, if the supplemental instruction only amplifies the initial
instructions, then no additional argument is necessary. United States v.
Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1271 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995).
9. Trial Judge Has Discretion Over Wording of Initial and Clarifying
Jury Instructions and Over Whether To Issue Any Particular Jury Instruc-
tion. There is no right to a particular wording of a jury instruction. United
States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1270 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970
(1995); United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 326 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
that trial judge has discretion over wording of instruction on defendant's
theory of defense), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996). "[I]n responding to
a jury's request for clarification on a charge, the district court's duty is
simply to respond to the jury's apparent source of confusion fairly and
accurately without creating prejudice.... The particular words chosen, like
the decision whether to issue any clarification at all, are left to the sound
discretion of the district court." United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646
(4th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Gray, 47 F.3d 1359, 1369 (4th
Cir. 1995) (holding that trial judge has discretion over whether facts warrant
issuing of jury instruction on defendant's theory of case).
10. Test for Reversible Error When Trial Court Refuses Defendant's
Requested Jury Instruction. "A district court's refusal to provide an instruc-
tion requested by a defendant constitutes reversible error only if the instruc-
tion: (1) was correct; (2) was not substantially covered by the court's charge
to the jury; and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important, that
failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant's
ability to conduct his defense." United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 32 (4th
Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (finding reversible error in deficient conspir-
acy instruction).
11. Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. An appeals court re-
views a trial court's decision to give or reject a jury instruction and the
contents of the instruction for abuse of discretion. The court "reviews jury
instructions in their entirety and as part of the whole trial .... [W]e deter-
mine, on that basis, 'whether the court adequately instructed the jury on the
elements of the offense and the accused's defenses."' United States v.
Bostian, 59 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (quoting United
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States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 317 (4th Cir. 1991)), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 929 (1996); see also United States v. Pearce, 65 F.3d 22 (4th Cir. 1995)
(reviewing supplemental instructions under same standard); United States v.
Burgoss, 55 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995). But a constitutional challenge to a
jury instruction is resolved according to whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner.
United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137 (4th Cir. 1995) (considering instruction
defining statutory terms); Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 1994)
(considering reasonable-doubt instruction), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2281
(1995).
BB. Verdict by Fewer Than Twelve Jurors (Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b))
Rule 23(b) provides that a verdict may be rendered by a jury of any
number fewer than twelve if both parties agree, or by eleven, if "after the
jury has retired," the trial court finds "just cause" to excuse the twelfth
juror. United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 515 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
that trial court did not abuse discretion in excusing ill twelfth juror after
deliberations had begun).
CC. Mistrial
1. Mistrial Disfavored But Left to Discretion of Trial Court. "The
decision whether to declare a mistrial is left to the sound discretion of the
trial judge. . . . In making such a determination, the district court should
consider whether there are less drastic alternatives to declaring a mistrial."
United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1268 (4th Cir.) (upholding denial of
mistrial for 32-day interruption in trial and denial of mistrial for alleged
government intimidation of defense witness), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970
(1995).
2. Defendant Must Show Actual Prejudice Caused by Interruption in
Trial. In United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1970 (1995), the defendant moved for a mistrial on account of a 32-
day interruption in the trial caused by the judge's vacation and the illness of
a codefendant. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the defendant had failed to
show any actual prejudice to himself and that arguments about whether the
interruption favored the defendant or the government were speculative,
which ameliorated part of the problem of the interruption. The court of
appeals did, however, caution that "the hiatus was a long one for a jury trial
and can be tolerated only as a rare exception." 1d. at 1268.
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DD. Motion for New Trial
1. Based On Newly Discovered Evidence. A new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence may be brought within two years after final
judgment and may be granted if a defendant establishes all five of the
following elements: (1) the evidence must be newly discovered since the
trial; (2) the defendant must show due diligence; (3) the evidence must not
be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence must be material; and
(5) the evidence must probably produce an acquittal. In United States v.
Singh, 54 F.3d 1182 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit found that because
the newly discovered evidence did not show the probability of an acquittal,
there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of a new trial.
Id. at 1190. The evidence for conviction was still overwhelming. Id.
2. Based on Newly Discovered "Information." A motion for a new trial
brought on the basis of newly discovered information that is not admissible
trial evidence but would, for instance, support a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel must be brought within seven days of the verdict. United
States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 650-51 (4th Cir. 1995).
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel May Be Grounds for Motion for
New Trial. If raised within seven days of the verdict, a motion for a new
trial may be based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. But the
trial court's decision on the motion is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776, 779 (4th Cir. 1995).
EE. Limited Post-Trial Right to Contact Juror (28 U.S.C. § 1867(a))
In United States v. Gray, 47 F.3d 1359 (4th Cir. 1995), the defendant
claimed that a doubt had arisen since his conviction about the English-
language proficiency of one of the jurors. Id. at 1366. The Fourth Circuit
upheld the trial court's ruling that the defendant had not brought up the claim
within the required seven days and that there was no manifest injustice
because all of the jurors had passed the statutory linguistic competency
standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1865. Gray, 47 F.3d at 1367.
VIII. Sentencing
A. Cases Remanded for Resentencing
United States v. Harrison, 58 F.3d 115 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanded for
failure to follow procedural rules for determining extent of upward departure
based on inadequacy of criminal history).
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United States v. Turner, 59 F.3d 481 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanded for
incorrect calculation of weight of LSD at sentencing).
United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
court may not force defendant to relinquish ERISA pension benefits for
restitution).
United States v. Stewart, 49 F.3d 121 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that pre-
trial detention when new sentence not imposed is not "imprisonment on a
sentence" under U.S.S.G. § 4A1. l(e)).
United States v. Chatterji, 46 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanded for
inappropriate application of "economic loss" under U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.1; no
record of rationale for upward departure in fine).
United States v. Hill, 59 F.3d 500 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanded for
incorrect calculation of "reasonable incremental punishment" under U.S.S.G
§ 5G1.3(c)).
United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanded for
incorrect calculation of "reasonable incremental punishment," U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.3(c), in sentence of one of two defendants).
United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanded for
failure to calculate "reasonable incremental punishment" under U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.3(c); holding that court may not delegate essential decisions about
restitution to probation office).
United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182 (4th Cir. 1995) (overturning
vulnerable-victim enhancement).
United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
district court erroneously awarded downward departure for substantial
assistance without government's initiating motion; holding that district court
erroneously awarded downward departure because defendant would be
vulnerable in prison; holding that district court erroneously awarded down-
ward departure sua sponte and without notice to government).
United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 124 (1995) (finding that district court must force defendant to get his
financial affairs in order so that district court can determine his ability to pay
fine).
United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanded for lack
of specific findings concerning obstruction-of-justice enhancement for
perjury).
United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that
quantity of drugs was miscounted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996).
United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that
amendment of perjury guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, caused ex post facto
problem), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
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United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143 (4th Cir. 1995) (find-
ing that restitution order went beyond offense of conviction).
B. Appeals Dismissed
United States v. Hill, 70 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that court
was without jurisdiction to hear appeal of extent of downward departure).
United States v. Speed, 53 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no juris-
diction to hear appeal of sentence within guideline range).
C. Plea Negotiations and Agreements
1. Plea Agreement Is Contract. Contract law governs the interpretation
of plea agreements. Both sides are entitled to the benefit of their bargains,
but neither side is entitled to more than it bargained for. Ashe v. Styles, 67
F.3d 46, 52 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1051 (1996).
2. The "Prisoners' Dilemma" and Government "Hardball." The
government may place two codefendants into a dilemma by offering the same
plea agreement to both but only accepting the plea agreement of the first to
agree. "The combination of statutory mandatory minimum sentences and the
exclusive power to move for downward departure based upon substantial
assistance allow the government to play hardball during plea negotiations."
United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791, 796 (4th Cir. 1995).
3. Failure to Appear Is Breach of Plea Agreement. "By jumping bail
and failing to appear, David violated the plea agreement and the govern-
ment's obligation to move for a downward departure based on substantial
assistance ended." United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113, 115 (4th Cir.
1995).
D. Sentencing Commission May Overturn Court Interpretations of
Guidelines
"The Sentencing Commission has the authority to review the work of
the courts and revise the Guidelines by adopting an interpretation of a
particular guideline in conflict with prior judicial constructions of that
guideline." United States v. Turner, 59 F.3d 481, 488 (4th Cir. 1995).
E. Rule of Lenity Favors Defendant at Sentencing
"The rule of lenity requires the sentencing court to impose the lesser of
two penalties where there is an actual ambiguity over which penalty should
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apply." United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 329 (1995).
F. Hearsay Is Allowed at Sentencing (§ 6A1.3(a))
Section 6A1.3(a) specifically provides that the rules of evidence,
including the rule against hearsay, do not apply at sentencing hearings.
United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1095 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The govern-
ment can rely on hearsay testimony to meet its burden of proof.").
G. Uniform Sentencing Is Goal of Guidelines
"The purpose of enacting the Sentencing Guidelines was to ensure some
measure of uniformity in federal sentencing .... " United States v. Stewart,
49 F.3d 121, 123 n.3. (4th Cir. 1995).
H. Sentences May Be Lowered f Guidelines Are Later Amended (18 U.S. C.
§ 3582 (c) (2))
Under the Guidelines, a court has discretion to reduce an already-
imposed sentence if the guideline on which the sentence was based is later
amended. United States v. Turner, 59 F.3d 481, 483 (4th Cir. 1995).
L Current Version of Guidelines Is Not Used When Ex Post Facto Clause
Is Implicated
Although a defendant is normally sentenced under the version of the
Guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing, this does not apply when the
Guidelines have been amended to the defendant's disadvantage between
commission of the crime and the date of sentencing. United States v.
Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 332 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796
(1996).
J. Factual Findings at Sentencing
1. Findings Must Be Specific Enough for Review. If factual findings at
sentencing are too "generalized," a reviewing court may not be able to
determine if a guideline was correctly applied. United States v. Singh, 54
F.3d 1182, 1192 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanded for re-sentencing).
2. Sentencing Court May Adopt Findings in Pre-Sentence Report. "A
district court may adopt the findings in a pre-sentence report in order to
sustain a particular sentencing decision." United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d
1182, 1192 (4th Cir. 1995).
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3. Sentencing Court May Adopt Government's Objections If Specific
Facts Are Included in Objections. There may be a sufficient record for
review of factual findings "when a district court adopts the government's
objections to a presentence report and the government's objections clearly
expound specific facts supporting the correct application of the Guidelines."
United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1192 (4th Cir. 1995).
4. Standard of Review: Clear Error. United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d
1364, 1371 (4th Cir. 1995) (regarding acceptance of responsibility); United
States v. Turner, 59 F.3d 481, 484 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Re-
Brook, 58 F.3d 961, 969 (4th Cir.) (determining whether enhancement
applied), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995); United States v. Chatterji, 46
F.3d 1336, 1340 (4th Cir. 1995) (determining amount of loss under
§ 2Fl.1.); United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1190 (4th Cir. 1995)
(discussing facts to sustain vulnerable-victim enhancement).
K. Interpretation of Sentencing Guidelines
1. Binding Nature of Commentary in Guidelines. "[C]ommentary that
interprets or explains a specific guideline is to be given the same force and
effect as the Guidelines language itself unless the Commentary 'violates the
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly errone-
ous reading of, that guideline."' United States v. Turner, 59 F.3d 481, 485
(4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915
(1993)).
2. State Law Is Not Needed. "A federal court construing the federal
Sentencing Guidelines need not turn to state law." United States v. Stewart,
49 F.3d 121, 123 n.3 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that Maryland statutory
definition of "imprisonment" was not binding on federal court).
3. Date of Sentencing Controls Guidelines Version Used (§ 1B1. 11(a)).
"Generally, subject to the limitations of the ex post facto clause, courts are
to use 'the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is
sentenced.' U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.1l(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)." United States
v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1109 (4th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, No.
95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1995).
4. When Guidelines Amendments Are Retroactive (§ 1BJ.1O). Section
1B1.10 lists certain amendments to the Guidelines that the Guidelines Com-
mission has decided are to be given retroactive effect and therefore are the
basis of sentencing reduction. But "courts can give retroactive effect to a
clarifying (as opposed to substantive) amendment regardless of whether it is
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listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 .... [A]n amendment should be classified as
substantive, not clarifying, when it cannot be reconciled with circuit prece-
dent." United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that amendment is substantive and therefore is not retroactive),
petition for cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1995).
L. Double Counting
"Double counting" is permissible under the Guidelines except where
expressly prohibited. Under double counting, the same conduct may serve
as a sentencing enhancement under two separate provisions of the Guide-
lines. United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (4th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Curtis, 934 F.2d 553, 536 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that "the
sentencing guidelines are explicit when double counting is forbidden").
M. Defendant May Not Protest Lesser Sentence of Codefendant
As long as all sentences are correctly calculated and sentenced within
the guideline range, defendants may not protest the lesser sentences of co-
defendants. United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1280 (4th Cir. 1995).
N. Defendant's Knowledge of Presentence Report (Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(c) (3) (A))
Failure to inquire at sentencing whether the defendant has read the
presentence report and discussed it with his attorney is plain error. United
States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 88-89 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that error
did not affect substantial rights).
0. Mandatory Life Sentences Are Constitutional
In United States v. Kratsas, 45 F.3d 63 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth
Circuit affirmed its 1994 decision in United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2754 (1994), that a life sentence required
by the federal drug statute was neither disproportionate to the offense nor
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment.
P. Sentence Less than Life Sentence Is Not Reviewable as Cruel and
Unusual Punishment
Sentences other than life sentences are not reviewable under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. United States
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v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 1995) (refusing to review 120-month
sentence for drug trafficking).
Q. Almost No Limit to What Court May Consider at Sentencing (18 U.S. C.
§ 3661, § 1BJ.4, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(4)(G))
According to § IB1.4, a sentencing court may consider "without limita-
tion, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of
the defendant unless otherwise prohibited by law." United States v. Gordon,
61 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that sentencing judge may con-
sider additional crimes not accounted for in plea agreement, defendant's
grand jury testimony, and personal knowledge of defendant from prior pro-
ceedings). But a sentence may not be based on "an unconstitutional classifi-
cation" such as race. United States v. Holmes, 60 F.3d 1134, 1137 (4th Cir.
1995) (concluding that sentencing enhancement in fraud case was based on
vulnerable-victim status rather than race).
R. Not Abuse of Discretion For Court to Refuse to Consider Tardy Objec-
tions to Presentence Report
In United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 749 (1996), the defendant failed to abide by a local rule requiring
that written objections to the presentence report be filed within 15 days [now
fixed at 14 days in Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(B)] after issuance of the
report. The Fourth Circuit upheld the sentencing court's refusal to entertain
tardy oral objections on the day of sentencing. Id. at 914.
S. Defendant Need Not Have Been Armed to Receive Enhancement for
"Express Threat of Death" During Robbery (§ 2B3. 1(b) (2) (F))
"[A] threat to shoot a firearm at a person during a robbery, created by
any combination of statements, gestures, or actions that would put an ordi-
nary victim in reasonable fear for his or her life, is an express threat of death
under § 2B3. l(b)(2)(F), even though the person delivering the threat is not
in possession of a firearm." United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161, 1167
(4th Cir. 1995) (agreeing with Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits,
and upholding enhancement on one bank robber for showing but not pointing
sawed-off shotgun and on another bank robber even though unarmed).
T. Decision-Making or Sensitive Position (U.S.S. G. § 2C1. 7(b) (1) (B))
In United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 431 (1995), the Fourth Circuit ruled that it was not clearly erroneous
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for the district court to conclude that an attorney for the West Virginia
Lottery Commission held a "sensitive position" because he was privy to
confidential information and because of his influence and the nature of the
advice his job called upon him to make. The defendant had argued that he
was on part-time status and that his job was simply to give legal advice and
perform such other duties as required. Id. at 970.
U. Loss (§ 2B1.1, 2F1.1)
1. Loss under § 2F1.1. "Loss under § 2Fl.1(b)(1) is the actual,
probable, or intended loss to the victims of the fraud." United States v.
Chatterji, 46 F.3d 1336, 1340 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Gain to Defendant or to Manufacturer Is Not Loss. "In appropriate
circumstances, a defendant's gain may provide an estimate of the loss....
However, gain is only an alternative measure of some actual, probable, or
intended loss; it is not a proxy for loss when there is none. . . Economic
gain to the manufacturer ... is not the appropriate measure of loss in [this]
situation." United States v. Chatterji, 46 F.3d 1336, 1340-42 (4th Cir.
1995) (finding no loss in regulatory fraud concerning manufacture and sale
of two new drugs).
3. Gain to Defendant Is Alternative Measure of Loss. When the amount
of loss caused by the defendant's conduct cannot be determined with cer-
tainty, the amount of gain realized by the defendant "is an available, alterna-
tive measure of estimating that loss." United States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776,
782 (4th Cir. 1995). Moreover, Application Note 8 of the Commentary to
§ 2F1.1 states that the "offender's gain from committing the fraud is an
alternative estimate that ordinarily will underestimate the loss." Id. at 781
(holding that loss was to taxpayers in medical-referral kickback scheme
involving federal welfare funds). Also, in United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d
1267 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit ruled that "the illegal profit" and
not just the "net monetary damage" in a complicated government procure-
ment-fraud case was a permissible measure of actual loss under § 2F1.1. Id.
at 1276.
4. Standard of Review. "While the question of the amount of loss is
generally one of fact subject to review only for clear error, the application
of a loss enhancement to undisputed facts is a question of law which we
review de novo." United States v. Chatterji, 46 F.3d 1336, 1340 (4th Cir.
1995).
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V. When Perjury Guideline (§ 2J1.2) Is Cross-Referenced to Accessory
Guideline (§ 2X3.1)
In two previous cases, United States v. Pierson, 946 F.2d 1044 (4th
Cir. 1991), and United States v. Jamison, 996 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1993), the
Fourth Circuit had construed § 211.2 to require a cross-reference to § 2X1.3
only when the perjury was committed in an effort to assist another person to
escape punishment. Jamison, 996 F.2d at 701-02; Pierson, 946 F.2d at
1049. Since those decisions, the Guidelines Commission amended § 2J1.2,
and in United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 796 (1996), the Fourth Circuit recognized that "[t]he Pierson-
Jamison distinction between those who commit perjury to protect themselves
from prosecution and those who commit perjury for the sole purpose of
assisting another is no longer relevant. Each perjurer will face an enhance-
ment of his base offense level under section 2X3.1." Id. at 331.
W. When Victim Is "Vulnerable" (§ 3A1.1)
A sentence may be enhanced by two levels if the victim is found to be
vulnerable. "[T]he district court must first look to the victim to determine
whether this particular victim was more vulnerable to the offense than the
world of possible victims. Then, the court must determine whether the
defendant specifically targeted the victim because of that vulnerability.t"
United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1192 (4th Cir. 1995) (overturning
vulnerable-victim enhancement because evidence failed to show that victims
were selected because of their vulnerability); see United States v. Holmes,
60 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding enhancement because
defendant selected victims with poor credit ratings as targets for fraud).
X. Role in Offense (§§ 3B1.1, 1.2)
1. Reduction Based on Comparison Both of Defendants and Elements
of Offense. In deciding whether a defendant merits a reduction for being a
minimal or minor participant in the offense, the sentencing court must "not
only compare the defendant's culpability to that of other participants, but
also 'measur[e] each participant's individual acts and relative culpability
against the elements of the offense of conviction.' Daughtrey, 874 F.2d at
216." United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763, 769 (4th Cir.) (allowing no
reduction), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2597 (1995).
2. Burden to Prove Reduction Is on Defendant. A defendant bears the
burden of proving any reduction by a preponderance of the evidence. United
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States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763, 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2597
(1995).
Y. Abuse of Position of Trust (§ 3B1.3)
1. Physician May Hold Position of Trust. In United States v. Adam, 70
F.3d 776 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial court's enhanc-
ing of a physician's sentence for abuse of position of trust in a medical-
referral kickback scheme involving federal welfare funds. The Fourth
Circuit ruled that physicians, who "exercise enormous discretion" and
normally receive "great deference," may be held accountable for abuse of
their discretion and the deference they receive. Id. at 782.
2. Bank Teller May Hold Position of Trust. Although the commentary
to §3B1.3 states that the "ordinary" bank teller is not in a position of trust,
a bank teller who is actually in a position of trust will not escape an enhance-
ment simply because she holds the title of bank teller. "The abuse of trust
enhancement was not designed to turn on formalistic definitions of job
type.... Rather, several factors must be considered by courts to determine
whether a defendant held a position of trust .... Overall, the question of
whether a defendant held a position of trust must be approached from the
perspective of the victim." United States v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 269 (4th
Cir. 1995) (teller had "special access" and committed "external violation of
trust" by aiding and abetting bank robbery).
Z. Obstructing or Impeding Justice (§ 3C1.1)
1. Threatening as Obstruction. The sentence of a defendant may be
enhanced two levels under § 3C1.1 if the sentencing court finds that he
obstructed justice during "the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing" of
the case. United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1095 (4th Cir. 1995)
(discussing threats against grand jury witness).
2. Perjury as Obstruction. If the enhancement is for perjury, the
sentencing court must make a finding on all the essential elements of perjury.
United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161, 1165 (4th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 1995). "The definition of perjury
under the Sentencing Guidelines is the same as that which obtains under the
substantive federal criminal law. It contains three elements: (1) false testi-
mony (2) concerning a material matter (3) given with the willful intent to
deceive. . . ." United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1995)
(enhancement overturned because no specific findings concerning elements
of perjury).
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AA. Acceptance of Responsibility (§ 3E1. 1)
1. Defendant Has Burden of Proof. "It is the defendant's burden to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his sentence should be
reduced for acceptance of responsibility." United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d
1364, 1371 (4th Cir. 1995); see United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267,
1279 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant must accept "personal responsi-
bility" for criminal conduct).
2. Defendant Who Goes to Trial Will Rarely Get Acceptance of Respon-
sibility. Section 3E1.1, comment. (n.2), specifically provides that accep-
tance of responsibility is not intended for those defendants who proceed to
trial. It is the "rare" defendant who win get acceptance after trial. United
States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1279 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no accep-
tance).
3. Relevant Factors. "The commentary to Sentencing Guideline
§ 3El. 1 lists a non-exhaustive set of factors that the district court may use
in deciding on acceptance of responsibility .... Conduct indicating accep-
tance of responsibility 'may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that
is inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility.' Id. comment. (n.3).
Further, in determining acceptance of responsibility, the district court may
look beyond the factors that constitute part of the conviction, even if those
factors would not be sufficiently relevant to increase the defendant's sen-
tence." United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364, 1372 (4th Cir. 1995) (deny-
ing acceptance despite factors in favor of acceptance where defendants
attempted to conceal crimes, partially denied crimes, left victim for dead in
woods, and later used victim's credit cards).
4. Standard of Review: Clear Error, Great Deference. "We review the
district judge's factual determination regarding whether to apply § 3E1.1
under the clearly erroneous standard. . . . 'The sentencing judge is in a
unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For
this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great
deference on review.' U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 comment. (n.5.)" United States
v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364, 1372 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding denial); see also
United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding denial of
acceptance where defendant intentionally misled law enforcement officers).
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BB. When PreTrial Detention Is Not "Imprisonment on a Sentence"
(§ 4A1.1(e))
In United States v. Stewart, 49 F.3d 121 (4th Cir. 1995), the district
court had enhanced the defendant's sentence two levels for commission of
an offense within two years of release from prison because during the two-
year period he had spent 24 days in custody before a prior parole violation
hearing. The Fourth Circuit reversed and found that the 24-day period was
not an "imprisonment on a sentence" because the defendant's parole was
eventually not revoked and he was not reincarcerated.
CC. When Prior Sentences Are "Related" (§ 4A1.2 (a) (2))
If prior sentences are "related" (i.e. consolidated for sentencing), they
will be treated under § 4A1.2(a)(2) as one sentence for purposes of calculat-
ing criminal history. ' But prior sentences are related only if there was a
factual relationship between them or if they wereformally consolidated (i.e.
by court order) for sentencing. United States v. Allen, 50 F.3d 294 (4th
Cir.) (holding that non-factually related offenses sentenced at same sentenc-
ing hearing without formal order of consolidation were not "related" for
Guideline purposes), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2630 (1995).
DD. Career Offender (§ 4B1.1)
1. Guidelines Commission Did Not Exceed Authority When It Classified
Certain Offenses Under Career Criminal Guideline (§ 4B1.2). In United
States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 749
(1996), the Fourth Circuit noted that it and most of the other federal circuits
had already rejected the argument "that the United States Sentencing Com-
mission exceeded the authority granted to it by Congress when it authorized
enhanced 'career offender' sentences for defendants with prior drug conspir-
acy convictions or whose instant offense is a drug conspiracy conviction."
Id. at 915 (citing United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 888-90 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995)).
2. Extortion Is Crime of Violence (§ 4B1.2, cmt. n.2). For purposes
of determining prior predicate convictions under the career-offender guide-
line, Application Note 2 of § 4B1.2 clearly provides that extortion is a crime
of violence. United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 932 (4th Cir. 1995).
3. Attempt Is Prior Predicate Conviction (§ 4B1. 2, cmt. n. 1). Applica-
tion Note 1 of § 4B1.2 clearly provides that a conviction for attempt to
commit a crime of violence or controlled substance offense qualifies as a
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prior predicate conviction for determining career-offender status. United
States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 932 (4th Cir. 1995).
4. Using Telephone for Drug Distribution Is Prior Predicate Conviction
(§ 4B1.2, cmt. n.1). Application Note 1 of § 4B1.2 provides that convic-
tions for attempting, aiding and abetting, or conspiring to commit a drug
offense qualify as prior predicate convictions for purposes of career-offender
status. In United States v. Walton, 56 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth
Circuit ruled that a prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) for using the
telephone for facilitating drug distribution was "equivalent to aiding and
abetting that distribution" and was therefore a prior predicate conviction. Id.
at 556.
EE. Restitution (§ 5E)
1. Ability to Pay Must Be Specically Addressed (18 U.S.C. § 3664(a)).
In imposing restitution, the sentencing court must make explicit factual
findings concerning the defendant's ability to pay and the burden of restitu-
tion on the defendant's dependents. Furthermore, the court must relate these
findings to the specific type and amount of restitution ordered. The sentenc-
ing court may satisfy this obligation by adopting the presentence report as
long as the report contains adequate factual findings to allow appellate
review. The defendant bears the burden of proving his inability to pay
restitution. United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1277 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting United States v. Plumley, 993 F.2d 1140, 1143 (4th Cir. 1993)).
2. Restitution May Be Imposed on Defendant with Negative Income
Based on Earning Ability. The sentencing court may impose restitution on
an indigent defendant based on his past business success and his above-
average earning capacity. United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267 (4th Cir.
1995).
3. Court May Not Force Payments of ERISA Pension Benefits. In
United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit ruled
that because Congress provided that ERISA benefits "may not be assigned
or alienated," 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), a court may not force a beneficiary
(the defendant) to pay his ERISA benefits as restitution, regardless of the
restitution provisions of the Victim Witness Protection Act (18 U.S.C.
§§ 3663-3664). However, the amount of benefits that the beneficiary
receives may be used to calculate the beneficiary's assets and ability to pay
restitution.
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4. Court May Not Delegate Essential Decisions About Restitution to
Probation Office. "[M]aking decisions about the amount of restitution, the
amount of installments, and their timing is a judicial function and therefore
is non-delegable." United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir.
1995).
5. When Restitution May Be Ordered (18 U.S.C. § 3663). A defendant
may be ordered to pay restitution not only to the most obvious "victim," but
also in a case involving a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity
to "any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct."
§ 3663(a)(2). In addition, restitution may be ordered to the extent agreed
upon in a plea agreement but with the caveat that the loss to be repaid must
have been a result of the defendant's criminal conduct. United States v.
Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1147 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding restitution
order improper). Absent a specific provision in a plea agreement, restitution
may not be ordered for losses that are a result of counts dismissed or acquit-
ted. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990).
FF. Fines (§ 5E)
1. Ability to Pay Must Be Specically Addressed (18 U.S.C. § 3572 (a)).
In ordering a fine, the sentencing court must make explicit factual findings
concerning the defendant's ability to pay and the burden of a fine on his
dependents. The sentencing court may satisfy this obligation by adopting the
presentence report if the report contains adequate factual findings to allow
appellate review. United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1277 (4th Cir.
1995).
2. Upward Departure from Fine Range. Section 5E1.2 of the Guide-
lines provides a method of calculating a fine range according to final offense
level. If a court is going to depart upwards from the fine range, it must
make findings in the record, including the normal upward-departure finding
(§ 5K2.0) of the factor not adequately considered by the Sentencing Com-
mission in determining the range. United States v. Chatterji, 46 F.3d 1336
(4th Cir. 1995).
3. Defendant May Not Evade His Burden of Proving Inability to Pay
Fine (§ 5E1.2(a)). Under § 5E1.2(a), a fine is to be imposed in all cases
except where "the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not
likely to become able to pay any fine." Because "[t]he defendant bears the
burden of demonstrating his present and prospective inability to pay," he
must get his financial affairs in order by the time of sentencing so that the
district court can make a determination of ability to pay. United States v.
552
FOR THE CRIMINAL PRACTTIONER
Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 376 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 124 (1995).
"The defendant cannot meet his burden of proof by simply frustrating the
court's ability to assess his financial condition.t" Id. at 377; see also United
States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant
must show present and future inability to pay).
GG. Reasonable Incremental Punishment to Undischarged Term of
Imprisonment (§ 5G1.3(c))
1. Enforced as Guideline. Section 5G1.3(c) is to be followed as if it
were a guideline, but according to its own terms it allows a sentencing judge
a measure of discretion. United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir.
1995); United States v. Hill, 59 F.3d 500 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Stewart, 59 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Definition of "Reasonable Incremental Punishment." Sometimes a
defendant is sentenced at a time when he is already serving a term of impris-
onment. If the sentence that he is already serving was for a crime committed
before his instant crime or has not been taken into consideration in the
instant sentencing calculation, then he is liable only for an incremental
penalty. "A reasonable incremental penalty is a sentence for the instant
offense that, together with the undischarged term of imprisonment [i.e., the
sentence that a defendant is already serving], approximates the sentence that
would have been imposed if the instant offense and the offense underlying
the undischarged term of imprisonment were before the court simultaneously
for sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2, U.S.S.G § 5G1.3(c), com-
ment. (n.3)." United States v. Hill, 59 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1995).
3. How to Calculate Reasonable Incremental Punishment. "[A] district
court should apply § 5G1.3(c) by first determining the guideline range for
the instant offense (the instant offense guideline range) and the appropriate
guideline range if the sentence were being imposed at the same time in
federal court for the instant offense and the offense for which the undis-
charged term of imprisonment is being served (the combined guideline
range)." United States v. Wiley-Dunaway, 40 F.3d 67, 71 (4th Cir. 1994).
"Then, considering the time served and the time remaining [i.e., the pre-
dicted time that the defendant will actually serve] on the undischarged
sentence, the court should impose a term of imprisonment within the instant
offense guideline range that results in a total punishment that is within the
combined guideline range .... In order to reach a total punishment that is
within the combined guideline range, the district court may order the sen-
tence imposed to be served consecutively or concurrently, in whole or in
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part, to the undischarged sentence. If no sentence can be imposed from
within the instant offense guideline range that will result in a total punish-
ment that is within the combined guideline range, the commentary to
§ 5G1.3 authorizes the district court, in its discretion, to depart from the
instant offense guideline range in order to accomplish this result." United
States v. Hill, 59 F.3d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Myers, 66 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that court incorrectly calcu-
lated sentence of one of two defendants); United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d
806 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanded because of failure to apply § 5G1.3).
4. "Reasonable Alternate Method" of Calculation. In United States v.
Stewart, 59 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit endorsed a "reason-
able alternate method" to the § 5GL.3(c) procedures because the district
court found for "a reason sufficiently articulated in the record" that those
procedures were "unduly complicated in this case." The Circuit noted that
the result was approximately the same as the § 5G1.3(c) procedures. Id. at
498-99; see also United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1995).
5. No Need to Predict Effect of Federal Sentence on State Parole
Board. In sentencing under § 5G1.3(c), the federal court must predict the
release date of the defendant from his state sentence. In United States v.
Stewart, the Fourth Circuit addressed the situation where the state parole
board alters the defendant's predicted release date based on the sentence the
federal court imposes. In Stewart, the court stated that the federal court
need not consider such a speculative effect of its sentencing because it en-
meshed the court in "the type of fine tuning that is unnecessary, and largely
impossible, where indeterminate undischarged state sentences are involved
in a federal sentencing proceeding." Id. at 499.
HH. Departures (§§ 5H, 5K, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b))
1. No Departures Without Notice. "[A] district court should depart
[upwards or downwards] from the Sentencing Guidelines only after both the
government and the defendant have received proper notice in order to
develop a full record." United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir.
1995) (agreeing with Second and Seventh Circuits and remanding departure
because no notice).
II. Downward Departures
1. No Appeal of Court's Refusal to Depart Downwards. Unless a
district court mistakenly believes that it lacks the authority to depart down-
wards, a refusal by the district court to depart downwards may not be
FOR THE CRIMINAL PRACTITIONER
appealed. United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 819 (1990)), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 732 (1996).
2. No Appeal of Extent of Downward Departure. "[W]e join ten other
courts of appeals that have denied review of challenges to the sufficiency of
downward departures. The fundamental flaw of such claims is that they
contest the district court's exercise of its sentencing discretion, for which no
right of appeal exists." United States v. Hill, 70 F.3d 321, 324 (4th Cir.
1995).
3. No Right to Continue Sentencing in Order to Have Opportunity to
Render Substantial Assistance (§ 5KI.1, Fed. R. Crim. P. 35). In United
States v. Speed, 53 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit ruled that
a defendant had no right to a continuance of his sentencing to give the
government an opportunity to allow him to render substantial assistance.
The court found that the defendant could give substantial assistance after his
sentencing via Fed. R. Crim. P. 35.
4. No Appeal of Court's Denial of Government's Motion for Downward
Departure for Substantial Assistance. The district court is not required to
accept a government motion on behalf of the defendant for a downward
departure for substantial assistance pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b). A
district court's refusal to grant such a motion is final and unreviewable.
United States v. Pridgen, 64 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1995).
5. "Substantial Assistance to the Judicial System" Is Not Basis for
Downward Departure. Defendant's "substantial assistance to the judicial
system" through his efforts to convince codefendants to plead guilty was not
a basis for a downward departure. Substantial assistance to the judicial
system is not a mitigating circumstance the Sentencing Commission failed
to adequately consider. United States v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 260 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 732 (1996).
6. Equitable Estoppel Is Not Basis for Downward Departure. In United
States v. Agubata, 60 F.3d 1081 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
929 (1996), the Fourth Circuit ruled that an immigration form incorrectly
stating the maximum penalty for illegal re-entry into the country could not
be used as a basis for a downward departure because "a calculated decision
to commit a felony cannot be termed reasonable reliance." Id. at 1084.
7. Downward Departure for Substantial Assistance Only at Motion of
Government (§ 5Ki.1). "A district court may depart from the guidelines
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based on a defendant's substantial assistance only upon motion of the gov-
ernment." United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113, 114 (4th Cir. 1995); see
also United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1995).
8. No General Duty on Government to Move to Depart Downwards
(§ 5K1.1). "The government has the power, but not the duty, to make such
a motion when a defendant has rendered substantial assistance." United
States v. David, 58 F.3d 113, 114 (4th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Maddox, 48 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1995).
9. Two Rare Grounds for Challenging Government's Refusal to Move
for Downward Departure (§ 5K].1). The government's refusal to make a
motion to depart downwards may be challenged only on the basis of an
unconstitutional motive or a lack of a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental objective. United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86 (4th Cir.
1995) (citing Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992)) (holding
that plea agreement explicitly reserved to government right both to request
substantial assistance and to decide whether to move for downward depar-
ture); United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791, 797 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
that government's strategy of offering same plea agreement to two defen-
dants, whomever accepted first, was "rationally related to the legitimate ends
of securing two convictions, expediting plea negotiations, and avoiding the
expense of at least one trial. ").
10. Bargained-For Duty on Government to Move to Depart Downwards
(§ 5K1.1). "[O]nce the government induces a defendant to plead guilty in
exchange for a promise of a 5K1.1 motion, the government's discretion is
subject to the terms of the plea agreement." United States v. David, 58 F.3d
113, 114 (4th Cir. 1995).
11. Government Need Not Make Motion if Defendant Has Breached
Plea Agreement (§ 5Ki.1). Appearing for sentencing is "an implicit term"
of a plea agreement, and the government need not make a motion on behalf
of a defendant who does not show up for his sentencing. United States v.
David, 58 F.3d 113, 115 (4th Cir. 1995).
12. Downward Departure for "Extraordinary Vulnerability to Victim-
ization in Prison." The list of possible grounds for departure in § 5K2 of the
Guidelines is not exclusive. In United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 603 (2d
Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit recognized a new departure ground, namely,
that a defendant could be awarded a downward departure because he was
found to be extraordinarily vulnerable to being victimized while in prison.
In United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit
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recognized the Lara departure but reversed as clearly erroneous the district
court's awarding of it. The Fourth Circuit stated that "this ground for
departure should be construed very narrowly." Id. at 798. The court of
appeals found that defendant Maddox would not be as vulnerable in prison
as the defendant in Lara and concluded that "[w]e . . .cannot condone
departing from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range for a crime of
violence involving a gun merely because the defendant appears to be meek,
cautious, and easily led." Id.
13. Mental and Emotional Conditions Are Not Ordinarily Basis For
Downward Departure (§ 5H1.3). Section 5H1.3 provides that mental and
emotional conditions of the defendant are not ordinarily relevant (but see
§ 5K2.13) in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applica-
ble guideline range. In United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791 (4th Cir.
1995), the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and found that the
borderline intelligence and dependent personality disorder of the defendant
were not mental and emotional conditions justifying a downward departure.
The circuit court credited testimony at sentencing that these two conditions
were common in the prison inmate population.
14. Family Responsibilities and Ties Are Not Ordinarily Basis for
Downward Departure (§ 5H1.6). Section 5H1.6 provides that the family
and community ties and responsibilities of the defendant are not ordinarily
a basis for a downward departure. "This Circuit has construed downward
departures based on family ties very narrowly." United States v. Maddox,
48 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanded for further findings); see also
United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990) (district court
overturned for not imprisoning mother who was sole custodian of two
children).
15. Court Need Not Hold Evidentiary Hearing on Motion for Down-
ward Departure. Whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion for
a downward departure is within the discretion of the sentencing court.
United States v. Pridgen, 64 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1995).
JJ. Upward Departures
1. Strict Procedures Promulgated for Departure Based on Inadequacy
of Criminal History (§ 4A1.3). In United States v. Harrison, 58 F.3d 115
(4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit tightened the requirements of its past
decisions for upward departures based on inadequacy of criminal history
(§ 4A1.3). The Circuit laid down the flat rule that when departing upwards,
a district court "must either make level-by-level findings to justify its depar-
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ture or, assuming supplementation of the record, conclude that [a defendant]
qualifies as a de facto career offender under the principles set for in Cash."
Id. at 119. Under the level-by-level method, a district court can "move to
successively higher categories only upon finding that the prior category does
not provide a sentence that adequately reflects the seriousness of the defen-
dant's criminal conduct." Id. at 118. After the last category, Category VI,
the court can invent (with proper findings) higher categories to meet the
needs of the case. United States v. Cash, 983 F.2d 558, 561 (4th Cir.
1992); see also United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 884 (4th Cir. 1992).
Under the de facto career-criminal method, "the district court may sentence
a defendant as a de facto career offender (§ 4B1.1) when he has committed
two crimes that would qualify as predicate crimes for career offender status,
but for some reason cannot be counted." Harrison, 58 F.3d at 118.
2. District Court May Use Analogy to Another Guideline. In United
States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit reviewed
a decision by the district court to depart upwards six levels because of the
greater danger in a bank robbery of the use of a sawed-off shotgun than of
the use of a handgun. The district court was sentencing under the robbery
guideline, § 2B3. 1, but noted that one of the firearm guidelines, § 2K2. 1,
made this distinction. The Fourth Circuit upheld this analogizing to another
guideline as principled and reasonable.
3. Refusal to Depart Upwards Is Not Appealable. If a district court
decides not to enter an upward departure, that decision is not appealable.
United States v. Harrison, 58 F.3d 115 (4th Cir. 1995).
4. Sentencing Court Must Rule on Record Whether Sentencing Guide-
lines Already Take Factors into Consideration (§ 5K2.0). To depart up-
wards, under § 5K2.0 a sentencing court must not only state that the Sen-
tencing Commission did not adequately take certain factors into consider-
ation when it formulated the guidelines, but also must make a finding on the
record. United States v. Hill, 59 F.3d 500 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
upward departure could not be justified because sentencing court did not go
through proper analysis); United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir.
1995) (holding that district court failed to give proper consideration but error
was harmless).
5. When Error Is Harmless. "If we are convinced that, on the whole,
the district court's reliance on an impermissible ground [for an upward
departure] did not affect its determination of the sentence (i.e., the sentence
was not a result of the district court's error), the case need not be remanded
for resentencing." United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364, 1375 (4th Cir.
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1995) (emphasis added) (holding that district court's failure to make findings
whether factor was adequately taken into consideration was harmless error
because record contained factual basis for departure and because other
grounds for upward departure were adequate).
6. Standard of Review: "Multi-Part Test of Reasonableness." "We
review the district court's upward departure under a 'multi-part test of
reasonableness.' United States v. Hummer, 916 F.2d 186, 192 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970 (1991). We examine first, de novo,
whether the district court's reasons for departing identify factors not ade-
quately taken into consideration in the Guidelines. We then analyze the
factual basis for those factors under a clearly erroneous standard. Finally,
we determine whether the identified factors warrant a departure from the
defendant's guideline range, and whether the departure imposed is reason-
able, reviewing the district court under an abuse of discretion standard."
United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364, 1374 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted).
KK. Violations of Probation or Supervised Release (Chapter 7)
1. Consecutive Sentences upon Revocation (§§ 7B1.3, 5G1. 3). Under
§ 7B1.3, sentences imposed upon the revocation of probation or supervised
release are to run consecutively to any sentence a defendant is already
serving. Similarly, when a defendant is already serving a sentence for
revocation of probation or supervised release, any new and additional
sentence should run consecutively to that revocation sentence. United States
v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Chapter Seven Policy Statements Not Binding for Revocations of
Supervised Release. In United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638 (4th Cir. 1995),
the Fourth Circuit, agreeing with all the other circuits, ruled that the policy
statements of Chapter Seven are not binding concerning revocation of
supervised release. The previous year, the court, in United States v.
Denard, 24 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 1994), made a similar ruling concerning
revocation of probation. In Davis, the defendant's supervised release was
revoked for drug possession. The district court did not sentence the defen-
dant to the minimum required by policy statement § 7B1.4(b)(2), but instead
sentenced him to the maximum allowed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) for the
class of supervised-release violation.
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LL. Appeal of Sentences
1. Four Bases for Appeal of Sentence (18 U.S. C. § 3742(a)). A
sentence may be appealed if it was imposed: (1) in violation of law; (2) as
a result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines; (3) for an offense for
which there was no sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable; or
(4) if it was greater that the sentence indicated in the applicable guideline
range. United States v. Hill, 70 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Only Limited Appeals Under Guidelines (18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)).
"Consistent with Congress' intent, we interpret our jurisdiction under
§ 3742(a) narrowly." United States v. Hill, 70 F.3d 321, 323-24 (4th Cir.
1995) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction to challenge sufficiency of
downward departure). Section 3742 "reflects Congress' measured judgment
to allow only limited appellate review of sentences imposed under the
guidelines." United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 1990).
3. No Appeal of Sentence Within Guideline Range. A sentence any-
where within the final guideline range may not be appealed. United States
v. Hill, 70 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying appeal of sentence at maxi-
mum of range).
4. De Novo
Legal interpretation of a guideline. United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d
1364 (4th Cir. 1995) (acceptance of responsibility); United States v. Singh,
54 F.3d 1182 (4th Cir. 1995) (vulnerable victim); United States v. Murray,
65 F.3d 1161 (4th Cir. 1995) (§ 2B3.l(b)(2)(F), "express threat of death").
Proper application of a guideline. United States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776
(4th Cir. 1995) (loss under § 2F1.1); United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161
(4th Cir. 1995) (applying guideline terminology to particular facts); United
States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092 (4th Cir. 1995) (considering whether district
court applied correct guideline); United States v. Hill, 59 F.3d 500 (4th Cir.
1995) (considering application of § 5G1.3, undischarged term of imprison-
ment); United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
amount of loss is factual determination reviewed for clear error); United
States v. Chatterji, 46 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying loss enhance-
ment, § 2Fl.I, to undisputed facts).
Legal interpretation of an amendment to the Guidelines. United States
v. Turner, 59 F.3d 481 (4th Cir. 1995).
Legal basis for a downward departure. United States v. Dorsey, 61
F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 732 (1996).
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Consecutive or concurrent sentences under § 5G1.3. United States v.
Myers, 66 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1995).
Whether the Sentencing Commission adequately considered a particular
factor as a potential basis for a departure. United States v. Maddox, 48
F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1995).
5. Abuse of Discretion
Reasonableness of extent of upward departure. United States v. Mur-
ray, 65 F.3d 1161 (4th Cir. 1995).
District court's decision to order consecutive or concurrent sentence.
United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092 (4th Cir. 1995).
Whether to hold evidentiary hearing on motion for downward departure.
United States v. Pridgen, 64 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1995).
6. Clear error
Factual findings at sentencing. United States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776
(4th Cir. 1995) (discussing physician as abuser of position of trust); United
States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing acceptance of
responsibility); United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161 (4th Cir. 1995)
(discussing whether defendant obstructed justice by committing perjury);
United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1995) (examining role in
offense); United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing
quantity of drugs), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 925 (1996); United States v.
Gordon, 61 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing abuse of position of
trust - enhancement that requires "a sophisticated factual determination");
United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing finding
of obstruction of justice based on determination of credibility of witnesses);
United States v. Turner, 59 F.3d 481 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing quantity of
drugs); United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir.) (discussing whether
enhancement applied), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995); United States v.
Castner, 50 F.3d 1267 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing acceptance of responsibil-
ity and amount of loss under § 2F1.1); United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d
791 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing acceptance of responsibility and factual
finding that defendant qualifies for downward departure); United States v.
ChatterJi, 46 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing amount of loss under
§ 2F1.1).
7. Due Deference
Section 3742(e)(2) of Title 18 requires the appeals court to apply "the
due deference standard of review" to the district court's application of the
guidelines to the facts. United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161, 1167 (4th
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Cir. 1995) (holding that under that standard, the "legal interpretation of
guidelines terminology and the application of that terminology to a particular
set of facts" are reviewed de novo) (citing United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d
399, 402 (4th Cir. 1990)). "On mixed questions of law and fact regarding
the Guidelines, we apply a due deference standard in reviewing the district
court." United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364, 1371 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing
United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 1989)).
8. Unreviewable
The decision of the district court not to depart from the sentencing
guidelines is unreviewable. United States v. Harrison, 58 F.3d 115 (4th Cir.
1995).
1X. APPEAL AND OTHER POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
A. Convictions Overturned
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (disagreeing with
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits concerning misappropriation theory of
securities fraud and overturning securities fraud conviction of director of
West Virginia state lottery because no deception in misappropriating non-
public information relating to video lottery contracts).
United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir.) (overturning securities
fraud conviction of West Virginia lottery official because no deception, only
"taking advantage" of nonpublic information for private gain), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 431 (1995).
United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (overturning
conviction due to failure to give balanced Allen charge).
Ostrander v. Green, 46 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1995) (overturning guilty
plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel).
United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361 (4th Cir.) (affirming multiple
convictions but overturning three extortion convictions because they dupli-
cated other convictions), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 124 (1995).
United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763 (4th Cir.) (finding that defendant
may not be convicted of drug conspiracy and drug enterprise under same
facts), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2597 (1995).
United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 266 (1995).
United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 1995) (same), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing for
failure to instruct jury on essential element).
FOR THE CRIMINAL PRA CTTIONER
United States v. Gray, 47 F.3d 1359 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing money
structuring counts of conviction because of Supreme Court decision constru-
ing the charged statute).
United States v. Tomlinson, 67 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that,
in felon-in-possession prosecution, government must prove that defendant
knew that firearm was short-barreled shotgun).
United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding erroneous
admission of prior consistent statement not harmless beyond reasonable
doubt).
United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing because
trial court refused to include defendant's requested complete conspiracy jury
instruction).
B. Other Cases Reversed and Remanded (See also cases remanded for
resentencing (§ VIIA))
United States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that district
court may not deny government's motion to dismiss indictment).
United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that in
context of plea negotiations, prosecutor may threaten uncooperative defen-
dant with greater charges).
United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding speedy-
trial seventy-day rule applies only when plea of not guilty has been entered),
cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1996) (No. 95-7756).
United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (reversing
three-judge panel by holding that dysfunctional bomb is dangerous weapon
or destructive device under three federal statutes), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
90 (1995).
United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that
district court erred in not holding mental-competency hearing).
United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that
district court failed to inform defendant of mandatory minimum sentence at
guilty plea).
Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279 (4th Cir.) (overturning federal
court's grant of writ of habeas corpus from state conviction because error,
if any, was harmless), cert. and stay of execution denied sub nom. Correll
v. Jabe, 116 S. Ct. 688 (1995).
Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59 (4th Cir.) (overturning federal district
court's grant of writ of habeas corpus from state conviction because new
federal constitutional rights are not promulgated on collateral review), stay
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granted, 116 S. Ct. 687 (1995), cert. granted in part, 116 S. Ct. 690
(1996).
Barnes v. Thompskon, 58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir.) (overturning federal
district court's grant of writ of habeas corpus from state conviction because
defendant defaulted at state level by failing to raise claim in timely manner),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 453 (1995).
Love v. Johnson, 57 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995) (ordering district court
to inspect materials to see if defendant's Brady rights were violated to decide
if writ of habeas corpus should issue).
Gilliam v. Foster, 61 F.3d 1070 (4th Cir. 1995) (en bane) (8-5 deci-
sion); Gilliam v. Foster, 63 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (7-5 deci-
sion) (enjoining state criminal trial on double jeopardy grounds because prior
state court judge erroneously granted mistrial over defendant's objections).
C. No Constitutional Right to Appeal
"Because the right to appeal is not protected by the Constitution, any
right to appeal must be found in an applicable statute." United States v.
Pridgen, 64 F.3d 147, 148 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977)).
D. Appeals Court Reluctant to Decide Constitutional Issues
The Fourth Circuit will not decide constitutional issues needlessly. The
court of appeals prefers to render decisions based on statutory or general
law. Ashe v. Styles, 67 F.3d 46, 51 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1051 (1996).
E. Panel Bound by Fourth Circuit Precedent
A three-judge panel of the circuit is bound by circuit precedent and may
not overrule precedent. United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182 (4th Cir.
1995).
F. District Court May Be Affirmed on Any Basis Supported by Record
An appeals court need not agree with the reasoning of a district court.
The reviewing court may affirm the result below on any ground that is
supported by the record. United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2631 (1995).
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G. Appeals Court Need Not Consider Argument Raised for First Time in
Reply Brief
Because the purpose of a reply brief is rebuttal, an appeals court need
not consider an issue raised for the first time in a reply brief. United States
v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995).
H. Appeals Court May Consider Constitutional Issue Sua Sponte
Although it is not required to do so, an appeals court may notice and
rule upon a constitutional issue sua sponte where "injustice might otherwise
result." United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 331 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995)
(citations and quotations omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
L Waiver of Appeals
1. Specific Question About Waiver of Appeal Is Not Mandatory. As
long as the waiver is "knowing and intelligent," the right to appeal may be
waived. While the standard test for a knowing and intelligent waiver is a
specific question to the defendant at his Rule 11 guilty plea, the court's
"failure to do so, standing alone, does not invalidate the waiver." United
States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing
United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1992)) (upholding
waiver despite no specific question).
2. Waiver of Appeal Will Not Overcome Improper Order of Restitution.
There are some limitations on waivers of appeal. For instance, a defendant
who waives his appeal rights may not be sentenced on the basis of an imper-
missible category such as race nor beyond the maximum penalty provided
by statute. In United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143 (4th Cir.
1995), the Fourth Circuit held that even though the defendant had waived
her right to appeal, she could still appeal the restitution part of her sentence
because it ordered restitution for conduct that went beyond her offense of
conviction. Id. at 1146.
J. Standards of Review
1. Appeal of Sentences. See Appeal of Sentences, supra Part VIII.LL.
2. Constitutional Error. See also Wien Constitutional Error Is Harm-
less, infra Part J.4.c.; Habeas Corpus - Standard for Review of Constitu-
tional Error, infra Part M.2. "The Supreme Court has created two catego-
ries of constitutional violations that may occur during the course of a crimi-
nal trial - trial errors which are subject to harmless error analysis and
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structural defects which are per se cause for reversal. Trial error has been
described as error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the
jury." United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 124 (1995) (citations omitted). Examples of structural defects are
denial of the right to counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))
and lack of impartiality of the judge (Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
3. Plain Error (Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b))
a. Standard of Review. When there is no objection below, an issue
can succeed in the appeals court only when the error is plain. In addition,
the plain error must affect substantial rights, that is, be prejudicial to the
defendant and affect the outcome below; and be of a type that "seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."
United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding error in
failure to follow required procedure at sentencing plain but not prejudicial
to defendant because, inter alia, defendant given minimum sentence anyway)
(quoting United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779 (1993)); see also
United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1272-74 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no
plain error in trial judge's refusal to recuse himself or in questioning of
witnesses).
b. Issues Reviewed Under Plain Error Analysis.
District court's failure to inquire of defendant at sentencing whether
defendant had read and discussed the presentence report with his attorney
was plain error but was not prejudicial. United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d
86 (4th Cir. 1995).
No plain error to refuse to allow individual questioning of counsel
at voir dire. United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 431 (1995).
No plain error in legal standard for acceptance of responsibility.
United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1995).
No plain error for admission of Rule 404(b) evidence when defen-
dant failed to object to wording of limiting instruction. United States v.
Powers, 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 784 (1996).
No plain error in denial of suppression of fruits of vehicular search.
United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2287 (1995).
No plain error in sustaining objection to prior consistent statement.
United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137 (4th Cir. 1995).
No plain error in prosecutor's remarks in closing argument. United
States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776 (4th Cir. 1995).
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No plain error in ordering of restitution and fines. United States v.
Castner, 50 F.3d 1267 (4th Cir. 1995).
4. Harmless Error (Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a))
a. Standard on Review. "[I]n order to find a district court's error
harmless, we need only be able to say with fair assurance, after pondering
all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that
the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error." United States v.
Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 325 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
b. Issues Reviewed Under Harmless Error Analysis. Erroneous
evidentiary rulings are not to be disturbed unless the error affected the
defendant's "substantial rights." (Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)). United States v.
Heater, 63 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
Erroneous Admission of Prior Consistent Statement. Erroneous
admission of prior consistent statement was not harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt because the jury below had acquitted the defendant of two of the
four bank robberies with which she was charged. United States v. Acker, 52
F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing two convictions and ordering new trial).
Habeas Corpus from State Proceedings. "[B]efore a federal habeas
court may grant relief as a result of the error, it must conclude that an error
infecting state criminal proceedings is not harmless . . . ." Correll v.
Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279, 1291 (4th Cir.) (finding error in state proceedings
harmless), cert. and stay of execution denied sub nom. Correll v. Jabe,
116 S. Ct. 688 (1995).
c. When Constitutional Error Is Harmless. A constitutional error
may be harmless if the reviewing court can conclude "beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury actually made" a finding that cures the constitutional
error. United States v. Forbes, 64 F.3d 928, 935 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding
failure to instruct jury on essential element of crime cured because missing
essential element was also essential element of another, related crime of
which the jury also found defendant guilty); see also United States v. John-
son, 71 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding failure to instruct jury on essential
element not to be harmless); United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361 (4th
Cir.) (finding misstatement of elements of offense to be harmless error),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 124 (1995).
5. Construction of Statutes and Regulations
a. Basic Canon of Construction. "We interpret a statute according
to its plain language and in light of its object and policy. Our inquiry is
complete if the terms of [the] statute are unambiguous on their face, or in
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light of ordinary rules of statutory construction.'" United States v. Turpin,
65 F.3d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 64
U.S.L.W. 3640 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-7260).
b. Statutes Are Presumed Constitutional. A "'heavy presumption
of constitutionality' attaches to the 'carefully considered decision[s] of a
coequal and representative branch of our Government."' In re Askin, 47
F.3d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Department ofLabor v. Triplett, 494
U.S. 715, 721 (1990)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 382 (1995).
c. Standards for Some Specific Constitutional Challenges.
Commerce Clause. "To discover whether a statute is within Con-
gress' authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause, the question we
must ask is merely whether Congress could reasonably find that the class of
regulated activities affects interstate commerce." United States v. Presley,
52 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir.) (requiring only "minimal nexus"), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 237 (1995).
Equal Protection Clause. "When a statute makes an irrational
classification, unrelated to a valid government purpose, it may violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution." United States v. Presley, 52
F.3d 64, 68 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 237 (1995).
Due Process Clause. When a provision of a statute is "so vague that
it grants undue discretion to law enforcement officials.., it may be void for
vagueness under the Due Process Clause." United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d
64, 68 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 237 (1995).
d. Presumption That Congress Knows Law Includes Presumption
That It Knows Court Interpretations. "It is firmly entrenched that Congress
is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law; that is with the
knowledge of the interpretation that courts have given to an existing statute."
United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that
presumption used as partial basis for court to find that Congress did not
intend sentencing amendment to change substantive firearm law), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 797 (1996).
e. Presumption That Congress Is Clear When It Intends to Change
Law. It is presumed that Congress will make its actions and intentions clear
when and if it changes a statute. "Absent a clear manifestation of contrary
intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with
existing law and its judicial construction." United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d
602, 605 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations and quotations omitted), cert denied, 116
S. Ct. 797 (1996).
f. Plain Language Controls over Legislative History. The Fourth
Circuit has always held that the first principle of statutory construction is the
"plain language" of the statute. In United States v. Williams, 67 F.3d 527
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(4th Cir. 1995), the court upheld this principle even against "a cogent,
imaginative argument" based on legislative history. Id. at 528.
g. Mens Rea Is Essential Element of Criminal Law. Mens rea is
such an essential element of criminal law that the courts will read it into a
statute, even when Congress has not been clear about the precise mens rea
or scienter required. "The [Supreme] Court has taken particular care...
to avoid construing a statute to dispense with mens rea where doing so would
criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct." United States v.
Forbes, 64 F.3d 928, 932 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
h. "Willftlly" versus "Knowingly. " "'[W]illfully,' especially in a
statute in which Congress simultaneously uses 'knowingly,' connotes a more
deliberate criminal purpose, sometimes to the point of requiring a specific
intent to violate the law." United States v. Forbes, 64 F.3d 928, 933 (4th
Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted) (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
655, 659 (1994)).
i. Other Rules of Statutory Construction. The law in effect at the
time of the commission of an offense controls. If Congress later changes the
law, the change cannot be applied retroactively. In re Askin, 47 F.3d 100
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 382 (1995). Close calls in statutory
construction are resolved in favor of the defendant ("the rule of lenity").
United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 329
(1995). "When interpreting a statute, rules of statutory construction require
that we give meaning to all statutory provisions and seek an interpretation
that permits us to read them with consistency." Id. at 99 (citing United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992)). The purpose of the
courts is to give effect to the legislative will. If statutory language is clear
and within constitutional authority, the "sole function" of the courts is to
enforce it according to its own terms. United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381
(4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1996) (No.
95-7756).
j. Reviewed De Novo. The construction of statutes is reviewed de
novo on appeal. United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 406 (1995).
k. When Regulations Have Effect of Law. When Congress autho-
rizes an executive agency to issue regulations that include punishments for
violations, those regulations have "the force and effect of law." United
States v. Fox, 60 F.3d 181, 184 (4th Cir. 1995).
L. Construction of Regulations Is Reviewed De Novo. An appeals
court reviews the construction of regulations de novo. United States v.
Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 1995).
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m. When Courts Should Avoid Literal Construction. For both
statutes and regulations, constructions, even if arguably literal, which
produce absurd results contrary to the legislature's or agency's purpose are
to be avoided. United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 344 (4th Cir. 1995).
6. Reasonableness
Whether the invasion of privacy in a wiretap (18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.)
has been minimized. United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 400 (1995).
7. De Novo
Review of the constitutionality of a mandatory life sentence. United
States v. Kratsas, 45 F.3d 63 (4th Cir. 1995).
Constitutionality of a statute. United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 237 (1995).
Regarding prosecution for felon in possession, review of state law to
determine whether a defendant's civil rights have been restored. United
States v. Morrell, 61 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 1995).
Whether officers had "reasonable suspicion" for a Terry stop. United
States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Perrin, 45
F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1995).
Legal conclusions concerning legitimacy of in-court identifications.
United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
Ineffective assistance of counsel. Ostrander v. Green, 46 F.3d 347 (4th
Cir. 1995) (mixed question of law and fact).
Construction of statutes. United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 406 (1995).
Construction of regulations. United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337 (4th
Cir. 1995).
Decision not to give an entrapment instruction. United States v. Singh,
54 F.3d 1182 (4th Cir. 1995).
Decision not to give a justification instruction. United States v. Perrin,
45 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1995).
Legal determinations at suppression hearing. United States v. Leshuk,
65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248 (4th
Cir. 1995).
Adequacy of guilty plea. United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400 (4th Cir.
1995) (guilty plea overturned).
Voluntariness of confession. Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279 (4th
Cir.), cert. and stay of execution denied sub nom. Correll v. Jabe,
116 S. Ct. 688 (1995).
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Denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus. Ashe v. Styles, 67 F.3d 46
(4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1051 (1996).
8. Abuse of Discretion
a. Wrong Legal Principle May Be Abuse of Discretion. "One of
the ways in which a district court may abuse its discretion is in applying
erroneous legal principles to the case." United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d
1286, 1290 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th
Cir. 1993)).
b. Issues Reviewed Under Abuse of Discretion.
Admission and exclusion of evidence. "A district court is given broad
discretion in its evidentiary rulings, which are entitled to substantial defer-
ence." United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161, 1170 (4th Cir. 1995).
"[E]ven if the grounds that the district court gave for admitting the evidence
are improper, generally this Court will reverse only if there are no grounds
upon which the district court could have properly admitted the evidence."
United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1156 (4th Cir.) (upholding admis-
sion of evidence under different rule of evidence than one relied on by
district court), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995); see also United States
v. Shaw, 69 F.3d 1249 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing residual hearsay excep-
tion); United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1995) (excluding
expert testimony); United States v. Turpin, 65 F.3d 1207 (4th Cir. 1995)
(discussing authentication of evidence), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3640
(Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-7260); United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161 (4th
Cir. 1995) (admitting eyewitness testimony); United States v. Capers, 61
F.3d 1100 (4th Cir. 1995) (considering admission of tape recordings and use
of transcripts), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1995);
United States v. Bumpass, 60 F.3d 1099 (4th Cir.) (considering hearsay
statement against interest), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 925 (1996); United
States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995) (excluding expert testimony
on relevancy grounds), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 784 (1996); United States
v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474 (4th Cir. 1995) (concerning evidence of lack of
intent), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 929 (1996); United States v. ReBrook, 58
F.3d 961 (4th Cir.) (distinguishing between hearsay and nonhearsay uses of
evidence), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995); United States v. Boyd, 53
F.3d 631 (4th Cir.) (applying evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 322 (1995); United States v. Gray, 47 F.3d 1359 (4th
Cir. 1995) (considering district court's refusal to caution jury regarding
inferences to be drawn from admitted evidence); United States v. Dorsey, 45
F.3d 809 (4th Cir.) (discussing expert testimony), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2631 (1995).
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Restricting scope of cross-examination. United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d
1259 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995).
Denial of motion to dismiss an indictment. United States v. Smith, 55
F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court's refusal to grant govern-
ment's motion to dismiss an indictment).
Denial of motion for mistrial. United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907
(4th Cir. 1995) (denying motion based on prosecutorial misconduct), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996); United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 346 (1995); United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d
1259 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995).
Denial of motion to continue. United States v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364
(4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239, 1245 (4th Cir.)
(stating that "To prevail, the defendants must show the denial prejudiced
their case."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 346 (1995); United States v. Speed,
53 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying motion to continue sentencing).
Denial of motion for new trial. United States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776
(4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182 (4th Cir. 1995).
Contents of jury instructions and decisions to give or not give jury
instructions. United States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 929 (1996); United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933 (4th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29 (4th Cir. 1995) (setting out
three-part test for reversal for failure to give defendant's requested instruc-
tion); United States v. Gray, 47 F.3d 1359 (4th Cir. 1995).
Denial of motion for recusal of judge. United States v. Gordon, 61
F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 1995).
Denial of severance. United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509 (4th Cir.
1995) (discussing severance of counts); United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763
(4th Cir.) (discussing severance of defendants), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2597 (1995).
Trial court's refusal to dismiss juror. United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d
1100 (4th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S. Dec. 4,
1995).
Denial of disclosure of government's confidential informant. United
States v. Gray, 47 F.3d 1359 (4th Cir. 1995).
Whether to allow jurors to take notes. United States v. Wild, 53 F.3d
328 (4th Cir. 1995). .
Whether "reasonable cause" for a mental-competency hearing exists
under 18 U.S.C. § 4241. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th Cir.
1995).
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9. Clearly Erroneous
Whether suspect was sufficiently seized to require Miranda warnings.
United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995).
Extent of personal knowledge of defendant by witness identifying him
in court. United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
Factual findings and credibility determinations at suppression hearings.
United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Murray, 65 F.3d 1161 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d
248 (4th Cir. 1995).
Prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248,
253 (4th Cir. 1995).
Finding of conspiracy by preponderance of evidence as precondition to
admission of co-conspirator's hearsay statement. United States v. Capers,
61 F.3d 1100 (4th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-7022 (U.S.
Dec. 4, 1995).
Factual findings concerning a Teny stop. United States v. Perrin, 45
F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1995).
Factual finding concerning whether government intimidated witness.
United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1970 (1995).
Trial court's decision about competency of juror. United States v.
Gray, 47 F.3d 1359 (4th Cir. 1995).
Trial court's decision about whether statements are subject to Jencks
Act. United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
322 (1995).
10. Sufficiency of the Evidence
"Challenges to the sufficiency of evidence must overcome a heavy
burden. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the govern-
ment, making all inferences and credibility determinations in its favor."
United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239, 1245 (4th Cir.) (holding evidence of
murder in drug crime sufficient), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 346 (1995). "The
standard of review in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence is whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Giunta, 925 F.2d
758, 764 (4th Cir. 1991). The standard requires us "to construe the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the government, assuming its credibility,
drawing all favorable inferences from it, and taking into account all the
evidence, however adduced." Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979)); see also United States v. Pearce, 65 F.3d 22, 24 (4th Cir.
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1995) (finding evidence of possession of document-making implements
sufficient). "The jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the
evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented, and if the
evidence supports different, reasonable interpretations, the jury decides
which interpretation to believe." United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148
(4th Cir. 1995) (finding evidence of assault on person assisting federal
agents sufficient). "In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a conviction, we do not review the credibility of the witnesses." United
States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763, 771 (4th Cir.) (affirming murder and maiming
counts), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2597 (1995). "Credibility determinations
are within the sole province of the jury and are not susceptible to judicial
review." United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995) (find-
ing sufficient evidence of willful damage to motor vehicles used in interstate
commerce). "The verdict must stand if there is substantive evidence to
support it." United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1107 (4th Cir. 1995)
(finding drug conspiracy evidence sufficient), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-
7022 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1995); see United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182 (4th
Cir. 1995) (finding sufficient evidence for conviction of physician for
illegally distributing drugs); United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150 (4th
Cir.) (finding evidence of single drug conspiracy sufficient), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 266 (1995); United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir.)
(finding evidence sufficient for wire fraud and money laundering convic-
tions), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995).
11. Great Deference
Magistrate judge's finding of probable cause for search warrant.
Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370 (4th Cir. 1995).
K. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. Elements of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. To state a valid claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that his
attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and (2) that he suffered prejudice as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984); United States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776 (4th Cir. 1995)
(finding no ineffective assistance); United States v. Foster, 68 F.3d 86 (4th
Cir. 1995) (same). Ineffective assistance is that which falls outside of the
"range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." That range
is "wide," and there is "a strong presumption" that counsel's performance
falls within it. Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (finding no ineffective
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assistance); see also Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279 (4th Cir.) (holding
that petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice), cert. and stay of execution
denied sub nom. Correll v. Jabe, 116 S. Ct. 688 (1995).
2. Failure to File Requested Appeal. "[F]ailure to file a requested
appeal is per se ineffective assistance of counsel, irrespective of the possibil-
ity of success on the merits." United States v. Foster, 68 F.3d 86, 88 (4th
Cir. 1995) (finding no ineffective assistance).
3. Failure to Know Law. "IThere is a difference between a bad
prediction within an accurate description of the law and gross misinformation
about the law itself.... [W]e must demand that [attorneys] at least apprise
themselves of the applicable law and provide their clients with a reasonably
accurate description of it." Ostrander v. Green, 46 F.3d 347, 355 (4th Cir.
1995) (finding ineffective assistance because attorney predicted work release
to client in Virginia state guilty-plea case where work release was pre-
cluded).
4. Failure to Anticipate New Rule of Law. "[T]he case law is clear that
an attorney's assistance is not rendered ineffective because he failed to
anticipate a new rule of law." Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1360 (4th
Cir. 1995) (finding no ineffective assistance).
5. Failure to Raise Mental Defense. When defense counsel has made
a decision to pursue a reasonable trial strategy, ineffective assistance of
counsel cannot later be raised against him for not pursuing a possible mental
defense. Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that
pursuit of defense leading to voluntary manslaughter conviction was accept-
able strategy); Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir.) (holding that
there is no requirement to obtain psychological examination of defendant nor
to present mental defense that would have undercut defense strategy at
sentencing in capital murder case), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 435 (1995).
6. Plea Proceedings Can Cure Misstatement of Counsel. In United
States v. Foster, 68 F.3d 86 (4th Cir. 1995), the defendant complained that
he received a higher sentence than his counsel had predicted. The Fourth
Circuit pointed out that at his Rule 11 formal plea the district court informed
him of the maximum possible penalty. "Therefore, if the trial court properly
informed Foster of the potential sentence he faced, he could not be preju-
diced by a misinformation his counsel allegedly provided him." Id. at 88.
7 "Tactical Retreat" Is Not Ineffective Assistance. In Bell v. Evatt, 72
F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 1995), defense counsel, in the face of overwhelming
evidence that the defendant was guilty of murder and kidnapping, devised a
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trial strategy of admission of the kidnapping and admission-but-mentally-ill
of the murder. The Fourth Circuit found this to be a reasonable "tactical
retreat" under the circumstances.
8. Standard of Review. Ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed
question of law and fact. Therefore, appellate review is de novo. Ostrander
v. Green, 46 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1995).
L. The "New Rule" Doctrine of Collateral Review (e.g., habeas corpus)
1. Definition. New rulings in constitutional law, usually by the Su-
preme Court, affect collateral review (e.g., habeas corpus) of criminal cases
in this manner: If a new ruling occurs after the criminal conviction becomes
final, then it may not be applied in reviewing the case. Ostrander v. Green,
46 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing new-rule doctrine); Turner v.
Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing at length new-rule doc-
trine); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (stating that there
is new rule "if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final"). However, the Supreme Court in
Teague established two exceptions for when a new rule may be applied
retroactively: (1) when it is necessary to afford constitutional protection to
certain "primary, private individual conduct" and (2) when "it requires the
observance of those procedures that are . .. implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (citations omitted); see also Love
v. Johnson, 57 F.3d 1305, 1315 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing new-rule doc-
trine); Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
constitutionally correct reasonable-doubt jury instruction is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2281 (1995).
2. New Rule Applies to All Cases Not Yet Final. New rules apply
retroactively to all cases not yet final. A case on appeal is not yet final.
United States v. Gray, 47 F.3d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Griffith
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)).
M. Habeas Corpus
1. Pretrial Habeas Corpus (28 U.S.C. § 2241). A defendant in custody
seeking to complain about a delay in arraignment or trial can apply for a writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. "Pretrial petitions for habeas
corpus 'are properly brought under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241, which applies to
person in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered
and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him."'
United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dicker-
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son v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
456 (1987)), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1996) (No. 95-
7756).
2. Habeas Corpus - Standard for Review of Constitutional Error. The
"standard for constitutional trial errors reviewed in federal habeas corpus
cases requir[es] reversal only if an error 'had substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury's verdict."' Cooper v. Taylor, 70 F.3d
1454, 1462 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 1710,
1712 (1993)). Four factors are determinative of the effect of the error:
(1) whether the case was tried by a court; (2) whether the evidence was a
confession; (3) how much the prosecution relied on the evidence; and (4) the
closeness of the case. Id. at 1463 (overturning state conviction because of
confession taken in violation of right to counsel); see also Ashe v. Styles, 67
F.3d 46, 51 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing court's hesitation to adjudicate
constitutional issues unnecessarily), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1051 (1996).
N. Habeas Corpus from State Conviction (28 U.S. C. § 2254)
1. Jurisdiction for Federal Relief and "Cause and Prejudice" Rule on
Default. "Because we review prior state-court judgments with the writ of
habeas corpus, basic principles of federalism permit us to review only those
state-court decisions that implicate federal constitutional rights. Therefore,
if a state court rules against a defendant on federal issues and the defendant
has exhausted all avenues of state-court relief, a federal court can hear the
defendant's federal claims by way of the Great Writ. Conversely, if a
defendant defaults by not following proper state appellate procedure, causing
the state courts to rule against him solely on state-law procedural grounds,
we have no power to review his defaulted issues because they are based
solely on state procedural grounds rather than federal constitutional grounds.
As the Supreme Court explained in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
750 (1991), if a state prisoner defaulted on his federal claims in state court
pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, he is pre-
cluded from asserting such claims in his federal habeas petition unless he
shows cause for and resulting prejudice from the default. . . . [W]e can
review it only upon a showing of cause for the procedural default and actual
prejudice from the asserted constitutional error." Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66
F.3d 1350, 1357 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying relief).
2. Facts Must Be Developed at State Level. "When the state has given
a petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop the
material facts supporting it, he is not entitled to develop further facts in a
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federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for
the failure and prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamental miscarriage
ofjustice." Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279, 1288 (4th Cir.) (overturn-
ing grant of federal habeas relief), cert. and stay of execution denied sub
nom. Correll v. Jabe, 116 S. Ct. 688 (1995).
3. "Raise It or Waive It" at State Level. "[The crux of federal habeas
corpus review is to provide criminal defendants with a mechanism to review
state court interpretations of federal constitutional protections, while provid-
ing deference to the state-court proceedings. Because our role is limited to
reviewing state-court judgments, federal review is inappropriate if a prisoner
failed to raise his claim and have it reviewed by a state court." Kornahrens
v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no automatic review
of the record for legal error, even in murder case).
4. State Remedies Must Be Exhausted. All available state remedies
must be exhausted before bringing a federal habeas corpus petition. "To do
so the habeas petitioner must have fairly presented to the state courts the
substance of his federal habeas corpus claim .... The ground relied upon
must be presented face-up and squarely. Oblique references which hint that
a theory may be lurking in the woodwork will not turn the trick." Townes
v. Murray, 68 F.3d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
5. State Basis as Alternative Basis for Decision. If the state court
below based its ruling alternatively on a state procedural and a federal
substantive holding, "a federal court must accord respect to the state law
[procedural] ground for decision, even if it is convinced the treatment of
federal law was incorrect." Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1358 (4th
Cir. 1995) (citing Ashe v. Styles, 39 F.3d 80, 86 (4th Cir. 1995)) (denying
habeas). "[l]f a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court
pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, he is barred
from raising those claims on federal collateral review unless he can show
cause for the default and prejudice resulting therefrom." Barnes v. Thomp-
son, 58 F.3d 971, 974 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 435 (1995).
6. Harmless-Error Test Applies. "[B]efore a federal habeas court may
grant relief as a result of the error, it must conclude that an error infecting
state criminal proceedings is not harmless ... ." Correll v. Thompson, 63
F.3d 1279, 1291 (4th Cir.) (finding error in state proceedings harmless),
cert. and stay of execution denied sub nom. Correll v. Jabe, 116 S. Ct. 688
(1995).
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7. State Factual Findings "Presumed To Be Correct." Subject to the
eight exceptions listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the factual findings of the
court at the state level are "presumed to be correct" in federal habeas pro-
ceedings. Sargent v. Waters, 71 F.3d 158 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
voluntariness of guilty plea is finding of fact); Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d
1279, 1288-90 (4th Cir.), cert. and stay of execution denied sub nom. Cor-
rell v. Jabe, 116 S. Ct. 688 (1995). The presumption of correctness applies
to findings of fact by state appellate courts as well as state trial courts.
Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (7-5 decision).
8. Federal Court Reluctance to Resolve Undecided Point of State Law.
"[W]e are reluctant to decide needlessly an important matter of state law that
has not been addressed conclusively by the state's courts." Ashe v. Styles,
67 F.3d 46, 51 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying habeas relief), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1051 (1996).
9. New Constitutional Rights Not Applied in Habeas Corpus. "[F]ed-
eral courts generally may not create or apply new constitutional rights on
collateral review." Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59, 64 (4th Cir.) (overturn-
ing district court's issuing of writ of habeas corpus; holding that there is no
constitutional right to appointment of private investigator; holding that there
is no constitutional right to advance notice of evidence concerning other bad
acts), stay granted, 116 S. Ct. 687 (1995), cert. granted in part, 116 S. Ct.
690 (1996).
10. No Constitutional Right to Counsel. There is no federal consti-
tutional right to counsel at state post-conviction hearings or at federal habeas
corpus hearings. Therefore, because federal habeas proceedings are con-
cerned only with constitutional violations, there can be no such thing as
ineffective assistance of counsel at such proceedings. Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d
1327 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that if petitioner's attorney at federal proceed-
ing failed to raise claim, claim is defaulted).
11. Standard of Review. "We review de novo a district court's
decision to deny a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.. .. [O]n federal
habeas review, 'a state court's factual findings are "presumed to be correct,"
whereas its findings on questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law
receive independent federal consideration."' Ashe v. Styles, 67 F.3d 46, 50
(4th Cir. 1995) (citing Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872, 886 n. 14 (4th Cir.
1994)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1051 (1996).
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